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ABSTRACT 
This report describes an economic assessment of 
the policies and strategies used to manage w er resources 
in New Zealand. A number of economic theories which relate 
to water allocation and water pollution control are 
outlined, with an emphasis on pricing theory. Results 
of a survey undertaken on charges made for municipal 
water and sewerage services and region water board 
charges are given. The strategies used in New Zealand 
to manage water resources and to provide finance for 
water-reI ed services are then evaluated in the light 
of overseas policies, and the strat ies suggested by 
economic theory. It is concluded that a greater use 
of pricing policies based on margin cost pricing, 
which relates charges to the cost of providing water 
services, would lead to a more efficient and equitable 
allocation of water resources. Specific recommendations 
for changes to water supply and sewerage service pricing, and 
for changes to existing water and soil management legislation 
are outlined. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Water forms a basis for man's production and consumption 
activities. Its importance was realised even by early 
civilizations. The ancient Greeks considered water to be 
one of the four "cardinal elements of exis nce" (Walker 
1975), and effective control of water use was a major factor 
in the success of civilizations in Mesopotamia and Egypt. 
Yet despite the fact that it is indispensible, particularly 
in Western civilizations, water has had a very low value in 
comparison with other commodities. Water resources have 
generally been so abundant, relative to the demand for them, 
that they have been available "for the taking". Mitchell and 
Kurak (1976) comment that "apparently because water does fall 
from the Heavens, we feel it is our right that we use all we 
want without cost.1I Similarly it was stated in a report for 
the United Nations Water Conference 1977 that EEC countries 
have encountered problems through lIa reluctance to change 
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from traditional views of water as being free and abundant with 
an inherent right to use it as one pleases." In economic terms, 
water has been considered as a free good. 
Because New Zealand has relatively plentiful supplies of 
water, it is hardly surprising that water supplies have been 
considered inexhaustible, except for isolated areas or in 
the short term. The development and use of water resources 
proceeded on this assumption until a few decades ago, and planning 
for water use in some cases still reflects elements of this view. 
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Today it is evident in many countries that water has become 
relatively scarce, in that there are many users competing for 
limited resources. At the same time as economic and population 
growth have brought about increases in the use of water for 
industrial and domestic purposes and as a medium of waste 
disposal, there has been a growing awareness of the importance 
of the "quality of life". In New Zealand particular value is now 
placed upon the availability of resources for recreational use 
and the other intangible benefits (e.g. vis~al and aesthetic) 
arising from them (Commission for the Environment, 1977). 
Thus there are a multitude of conflicting interests, not 
only between the potential developers, but between those who wish 
to develop and thb~e who wish to preserve water resources. Water 
managers are faced with the problem of reconciling concern for the 
environment with society's desires for the material benefits 
. ar is ing from the velopment and use of water resources • 
If a resource is scarce, then it is in the interests of 
society that the resource be used so as to ensure the maximum 
beneficial r urn, and that suitable devices be developed 
to allocate water in a way which is compatible with this 
objective. The success of management in achieving the objective 
will be, to a great extent, determined by the policies chosen. 
Although problems of water pollution and water supply 
shortages have been evident in New Zealand for some time, 
it is relatively recently that any real control over water use 
has been exerted, apart from the imposition of certain health 
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standards. Over the past 2 or 3 decades, a vari y of strategies 
and techniques for managing water resources have been developed. 
These strategies have included payment in various forms for 
municipal water supply and sewerage services, and a com-
prehensive water rights system governing the use of natural 
water. A large number 'of statutes, regulations and by-laws 
pertaining to water use now exists. 
At the same time as the development of these strategies 
has taken place, there has been considerable interest shown 
by economists in various economic aspects of water use. Earlier 
work focused on the benefits arising from water use, particularly 
in terms of hydro-electric power and irrigation projects. 
Attention has been giveh to the factors affecting demand for 
water, particularly pricing policies and their effects on both 
municipal water and sewerage service demand. More recently a 
a number of theories relating to pollution have been developed, 
and methods of controlling water quality have been examined from 
an economic Viewpoint. 
It has generally been accepted that a number of these 
economic theories are of considerable use in bringing about 
the efficient and equitable allocation of scarce water resources, 
although it is not claimed that economic theory will provide 
all the answers. (Readers are asked to note that words under-
lin ed in th e t es tare def ined in the glossary.) 
In particular, economists have considered the pricing 
mechanism to be a powerful means of achieving the above obje ive. 
The general function of prices in the economy is to alloc e 
resources amongst various consumption and production activities. 
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Prices are signals for both consumers and producers, providing 
checks and balances for production and consumption of goods under 
government control, as well as private goods. With regard to 
water related services, prices may be used for a number of 
purposes, including the recovery of costs incurred in supply, 
the allocation of costs to the beneficiaries of a service, 
and the avoidance of over-investment in water development. 
While it is true that market im~rfections would prevent the 
efficient allocation of water by the market mechanism alone, 
economists argue (National Water Commission 1973) that the 
incorporation of a pricing system within current legal and 
administrative frameworks would enhance the efficiency of 
water use. 
An examination of water supply/disposal and water manage-
ment policy in New Zealand reveals th there has been little 
recourse to the pricing mechanism as a means of controlling 
water use. Predominantly, there have been a variety of institution-
al and legal arrangements which have sought to allocate water by 
non-market means. The management of water resources has 
frequently been appro hed as a problem of engineering rather than 
economics, and little if any consider ion has been given to 
the impact of prices on demand. Such an attitude may have been 
justifiable when water resources were virtually inexhaustible, 
but it is obvious that this is no longer so. It now seems 
essential to consider the wider use of economic analysis 
as a basis for management policies. 
This project conducts an economic assessment of the 
policies and strategies used in the management of water 
resources and water related services in New Zealand. Section 
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2 examines a number of economic theories, and their applicationn 
to water allocation problems. In particular, it considers 
the properties of water which differenti e it from other 
commodities and its nature as an economic good; that is, 
whether it can be considered as a , social, or 
good. This differenti ion has important implications for 
the management of water resources t d ermining whether a 
pricing policy can or shOUld be appli This section will 
also cover the effectiveness of different types of pricing 
policies, and the theories related to unpriced effects 
(externalities) and their implications for pollution control 
strategies. 
Sections 3 and 4 examine the legal and administrative frame-
work of water man ement in New Zealand, and outline the results 
of the survey undertaken of charges for water and water related 
servjces. The theories outlined are used as a basis for answering 
some of the questions which arise regarding water management and 
water services. For example: 
Should pricing be used as a means of allocating water 
resources? 
Should the pricing of water take into account income 
distribution objectives? 
What vel of pollution is optimal; and who should bear 
the costs of pollution control, and the remaining damage costs? 
6 
New Zealand policies are contrasted with overseas practice, 
and examined in the light of the ideal approaches suggested 
by economic theory. Section 5 assesses the extent to which 
current water management systems do use pricing policies, 
demonstrates where prices are not set in an efficient or 
equitable manner, and suggests areas where an improvement of 
pricing policies could lead to a better use of water resources, 
and water related services. Finally in section 6, recommendations 
are made for the shape of future water management policies. 
2. SOME ECONOMIC THEORIES AND THEIR USE IN WATER MANAGEMENT 
2.1 WATER RESOURCES - THEIR PROPERTIES AND USES 
It is not the aim of this report 'to carry out an ex~ 
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haustive analysis of the properties of water resources, and the 
uses to which they can be put. However, there are certain 
special features of water which need to be recognized before 
a well-informed discussion about water resource allocation 
can take place. 
Resources are frequently defined as being "stock" (non-
renewable) or"flo~ (renewable). Water belongs to the latter 
category in that it has a capacity for self-renewal; its 
use for one purpose does not necessarily prevent it from 
being used 1 er for other purposes. This capacity for s f 
renewal has important implications for water management. 
Hamilton (1971) points out that 
"Water is a living medium which fluctuates •••• 
according to regular biochemical cycles •••• The 
sufficiency of the cycl.es depends upon the assimilation 
and transformation by each state of the products of 
the preceding one". 
In other words, the self-renewal capacity of water is largely 
determined by the uses to which it is put. 
Also important is the fact that water, like air, is mobile 
over the face of the earth. Thus it can be considered as a 
"common property" resource, in which it is difficult to gain 
absolut e rights of own ership. As a "fugi t iv e" resource, wat er 
is no-one's pro~erty until it is captured. But as Dales (1968) 
comments, "everyone's property is no one's property". This 
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common property feature of water has important implications for econ-
omic considerations of water allocation, and gives rise to market 
imperfections. However, the presence of these does not imply 
that economic analysis is of no value in solving water allocation 
problems. 
Early economic theory stemming from the writing of 
Adam Smith emphasized the importance of the "invis.ible hand" 
effect in ensuring the efficient allocation of resources. 
Adam Smith stated that 
"Every individual is continually exerting himself 
to find out the most advant eous employment for what-
ever capital he can command. It is his own advantage 
indeed, and not that of society which he has in view. 
But the study of his own advantage naturally, or 
rather necessarily, leads him to prefer the employment 
which is most advantageous to society". Each individual 
was "led by an invisible hand to promote an end which 
was no part of his intention." (Adam Smith in Tisdell 
1972). 
However, more recent writers have introduced the conc t 
of the "invisible foot" whereby private self-interest "kicks' 
the common good to pieces" (Daly 1971). In situations 
a) where individuals do not take into account the unpriced 
effects which they impose on others, or b) where individuals 
cannot make decisions about social goods which are rational 
in terms of society's good without some coo~inating social 
rule, then the operation of the market fails. 
It is also essential to realise th very substantial 
interdependencies exist among water uses (National Water 
Commission 1973). Water is typically used and re-used until 
"lost" through evaporation or to groundwater aguifer§. or the oceans. 
9 
A unit of water within a stream may be used for navigation, wa e 
dilution and disposal, recreation, hydro-electric power and 
fish production. On the other hand, water may be removed 
from a stream and used for municipal, industrial, and 
agricultural supply_ A certain proportion of the water 
removed eventually becomes available for reuse, but it may 
be substantially changed in quantity. 
The use of water for one purpose will generally restrict 
its availability for non-compatible uses. 
Some attempts have been made to define the extent to 
which one use of water precludes other uses. Traditionally 
a distinction is made between "consumptive" and " non -
consumptive" uses~ whidh Walker (1975) defines as follows: 
"Consumptive uses ••••• include any uses which 
are consumptive of either quantity or quality of the 
resource, and therefore affect other actual or potential 
users." 
Human and animal consumption, and water incorporated in or used 
in the production of goods for consumption are examples of 
consumptive uses, and are often referred to as "withdrawal uses". 
The use of water for waste disposal can also be regarded as 
consumptive. 
Walker defines non-consumptive uses as being those which 
"may depend on particular quality and quantity 
being available, (but) do not usually reduce or affect 
either quantity or quality." 
These include recreational uses (direct, as for swimming and 
boating,and indirect, usually visual or aesthetic considerations), 
use as a life medium for aquatic biota, for power production, 
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and for transportation and navigation. Such definitions are not 
entirely satisfactory, however, since even the "non-consumptive" 
use of water may make it less available to other Users. Further-
more, uses which are incompatible in one situ ion may be 
compatible in another. 
The nature of use has an important bearing on the prices 
~Ihich should be charged for water or water-related services. 
It is emphasized by the National Water Cornmissio n (1973) 
that the critical factor is that: 
"the evalu ion of water should give full recognition 
to the effect that each use has on subsequent uses ••••• 
Ideally water uses would be priced on the basis of how 
much of the "usefulness" is taken out of the water." 
This implies that quantities of water used are not the only 
factor to be considered for abstraction pricing (Johnson 1970). 
A further concept arising from such interdependencies is 
that water and waste-water need to be considered as one good, 
in limited supply. Case (1972) argues that water quality 
problems can be viewed as only one aspect of the broader 
problem of water allocation and development in general. The 
degradation of water quality involves the diminishing of available 
supply, while the provision of extra supply generally gives rise 
to an increase in waste-water. Such relationships have tended 
to be overlooked in New Zealand, where a single use approach 
to water management has often been evident. 
Despite the fact that water as a commodity has some special 
features, Hirschleifer et al (1968) note that it does not have 
the unique importance that some writers would suggest. Committ-
ments to clean water "at all cost" are no more likely to en-
courage an efficient allocation of water than disregarding water 
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pollution problems. Nor is it necessarily true that private 
ownership of a common property resource is unwise or dangerous. 
However, the following examination of the use of economic 
measures to motivate better use of water will bear in mind 
the features which differentiate it from other commodities. 
2.2 WATER AS AN ECONOMIC GOOD: SOCIAL, PRIVATE AND MERIT GOODS 
Before evaluating the charging policies used in New 
Zealand to regulate water use, it is appropriate to outline 
why many economists feel that the pricing mechanism can and 
should be used as a means of allocating water and water 
services. 
Economists commonty talk about "priv e" and "social", 
goods. The distinction between these is shown in Table 1. 
Private goods are characterized by the f ures of excludability 
and rival consumption. The benefits of consumption accrue only 
to the consumer; consumption of the good by one individual 
precludes its consumption by another. Furthermore, it is 
possible to exclude individuals from consumption of private 
goods. It is generally reed that, under certain conditions, 
the market is an efficient mechanism for the provision of 
private goods. 
For social goods, however, a different mechanism of 
prOVision is needed because the criteria of excludability and 
rival consumption do not apply. Market failure may arise 
because exclusion of individuals is too costly, or impossible 
TABLE 1: 
(after Mulgrav8 and Mulgrave 1973) 
Feasible 
CONSUMPTION 
Rival 
1 
l\lon rival 
3 
EXCLUDABILITY--------------------~-------------
Not feasible 
Case 1: private good 
Case 4: pure social good 
2 4 
Cases 3 and 4 tog~ther: usually considered as social 
goods because they involve non-rival consumption. 
Case 2: not usually considered as a social good because 
consumption is riv 
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even though exclusion should be applied through the pricing 
mechanism to achieve the most efficient use of available 
resources. Market failure may also arise where the con-
sumption of a good by one individual does not preclude its 
use by another individual. These causes of market failure 
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may be combined, into a case where exclusion both cannot and 
should not be applied, since it would be impossible, and 
inefficient if it were possible. Examples of such "pure" 
social goods include clean r, and national defence. Social 
goods tend to be publicly provided. Since the market mechanism 
does not reveal social good preferences, choices are indicated 
through the voting process. 
In reality, such ~harp polarization between private and 
social goods does not occur. Mix situations of various 
types arise, and social-good type problems appear wherever 
private consumption generates externalities, or unpriced 
effects on other individuals (see Section 2.4.1). These 
unpriced effects are not taken into account by the market 
mechanism, and hence some form of public regulation is 
required. 
A third type of good, the merit good, is also defined by 
economists. Certain goods are held to be "meritious" by 
public decision makers, and their provision is supported in 
various ways. These merit goods may be social or private 
goods, according to previous definitions. Merit goods generate 
benefits which extend beyond the initial consumer, that is, the 
person actually receiving the good. Merit goods may be directed 
towards the poor, for example, the provision of low cost 
housing. Other examples of merit goods include water supply 
and sewerage services (which aim to maintain public health), 
and education. The provision of merit goods allows for 
externalities which are not taken into account in individual 
consumption decisions. For example, it is in the public 
interest that individuals consume a certain level of water 
and sewerage services because their health has effects not 
only on themselves, but on the whole community. 
How then should water and water related seDvices be 
regarded? Are they social goods, which should not be charged 
for because the consumption of the resource by one individual 
does not affect consumption by another? Or are they merit 
goods which should be provid at no charge, or at a very low 
charge, in order to achieve certain social objectives? 
Perhaps there was a time when w er was so plentiful 
relative to demand that it could be regarded as a social good. 
Furthermore, the maintenance of certain levels of public 
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he th and standards of living would appear to be a justifiable 
social objective. Does this then mean that the pricing mechanism 
should play no part in the allocation of water resources and 
services? On the contrary, it can be shown that pricing is a 
powerful and effective tool for the efficient allocation of 
water resources. Consumption of water by one individual does 
affect consumption by another, and exclusion through pricing 
is possible; therefore water is far more a private good in 
nature than a social good. Furthermore, it can be shown that 
requirements for water are far in excess of the amounts of 
water needed for essential purposes. It is not in the public 
interest to subsidise the wasteful and inefficient use of 
water resources. Water needs to be considered as a mixed 
good. It can be allocated efficiently by a pricing mechanism, 
but since externalities are associated with the use of water, 
government intervention is required to ensure that prices 
reflect these "unpriced effects" generated by water use. 
2.3 PRICING POLICI FOR WATER AND WATER SERVICES 
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Unless a commodity is available in limitless quantities, 
an expansion in the output of one item usually requires the 
withdrawal of resources from the production of some other item. 
As pointed out in Section 1, the general role of prices in the 
economy is to balance benefits and costs at the margin. In 
the case of the perfect market, prices are determined by a 
market mechanism which automaticallY adjusts prices so that 
the quantity of goods demanded equals th of goods supplied. 
In cases where market failure occurs, some form of pricing or 
charging policy is requir 
Traditionally, water resource man ement has been based 
on a preoccupation with engineering structures, and the objective 
of meeting forecasted "requirements" (Hanke and Boland 1971; 
Mann 1970). In particular, engineers have tended to assume 
that the quantity of water demanded is ind endent of price 
(Lobb 1975). However, a number of studies (Morgan 1973; Young 
1973) have shown th water consumption is affected by price, 
among other factors. Hanke (1975) pointed out that pricing 
policies of water enterprises are more often founded on 
financial than economic criteria. The "engineering" approach 
of setting prices for water supply is con~rasted with the 
"economic" approach in Fig.1. Hanke also noted th financial 
criteria are often applied "ex post" and are not an integrated 
part of a pricing-investment process. 
The United Nations Economic and Social Council (1977) 
suggested a number of criteria which should be considered in 
assessing pricing policies. 
i) Allocative efficiency. Economic efficiency is served 
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by a pricing policy which follows the marginal cost pricing rule. 
This implies that water users should pay the full incremental 
cost of the water they consume. Where subsidies exist, water 
is underpriced and overused so that increment costs exceed 
incremental benefits. Prices need to be considered in terms of 
a) the resource cost information which they convey to consumers, 
and b) the incentive consumers have to react rationally to that 
information. 
ii) This criteria is concerned with the distribution 
or incidence of benefits and costs. Two principles may apply. 
The first, concerned with a users ability to pay, would make 
prices higher for those with high incomes. However, this 
principle is not consistent with allocative efficiency. It is 
often argued that an "ability to pay" pricing policy is an 
inefficient and inappropriate means of me ing income distribution 
objectives. The second principle defines equity in terms of 
FINANCIAL-TECHNICAL 
APPROACH 
Forecast water use 
requirements 
Design new 
capacity 
Analyse costs 
Recover 
of cost 
SET RATES 
ECONOMIC 
APPROACH 
Compare ex ting 
and 
desired ca 
Design new 
capacity 
Analyse costs 
Price equa 
arginal cos 
Water rate 
making 
philosophy 
SET RATES 
FORECAST 
WATER DEMANDS 
Feedback process 
operates until 
incremental costs are 
equal to 
incremental benefits 
FIGURE 1: Approaches to the setting of water prices 
{after Hanke, 1975) 
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consumers receiving equal benefits meeting the same costs. This 
principle is compatible with the ~ficiency objective since 
consumers would pay in proportion to benefits received. 
iii) Certain costs are involved in 
establishing any pricing system. It must be ascertained that 
these costs do not exceed the allocative benefits derived 
from marginal cost pricing. 
Hanke and Davis (1973) mentioned a fourth criteria, 
investment information. They stated that "Adopting a pricing 
system generates useful information regarding the consumers 
willingness to pay for additional units of output". 
2.3.1 
Charging for water on a "financial" basis, or attempting 
to control water use by regul ions,generally implies that 
charges do not serve th r allocative function. Economic 
theory reasons that, with economic efficiency as a criteria, 
social welfare is maximised when the price of a service or 
commodity is equated with the cost of producing another unit of 
the same service or commodity. If price is set b ow the 
marginal cost of producing a commodity, then the value of the 
extra unit to the consumer (the price) is less than the value 
of the resources that went into its production. Too much of the 
commodity is being produced and consumed, foregoing the use of 
resources for more beneficial purposes (Fig. 2). Herein lies 
the principle of incremental or marginal cost pricing. This 
principle can be applied to a wide variety of water allocation 
problems including water supply, and water pollution control. 
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[VIR :::: marginal reven ue 
PRICE AR = average re ven ue 
MC == marginal cost 
AC = average cost 
AC 
Y - - -
AR 
OL-____________________ ~ ________________ ~ ______________ ~ 
QUANTITY 
Explanation~ The basic rule for efficient pricing 
is that price should equal marginal cost. If MC 
falls short of AR or price, then society gains by 
producing more, For example, if price is set at 
Z, then the value to the consumer of an extra unit 
is greater than the cost of producing this unit. 
The above situation could apply to a water utility 
not facing decreasing costs, and can be compared 
to the decreasing cost situation in Figure 3. 
FIGURE 2: An explanation of marginal cost pricing 
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Hanke and Davis (1973) state th the relevant marginal 
cost concept is that of the marginal opportunity cost, or the 
value foregone by not using the resource for alternative purposes. 
As emphasized previously, water has many competing uses, and 
hence its marginal cost in one use should reflect not only 
costs involved in providing the water service (e.g. treatment 
and delivery costs), but also the value of other uses of the 
water foregone. 
It is true that the "ideal" marginal cost pricing policy 
cannot always be applied, through problems of information, 
implement ion and administr ion. However, th~ discussion in 
Section 5 will demonstrate that, as Hanke and Davis (1973) 
asserted, "even a loose application of the marginal principle 
would be a significant improvement" on present charging systems. 
2.3.2 
At times, marginal cost pricing may not meet the financial 
objective of pricing systems; charges related to marginal 
costs may fail to yield sufficient revenue to cover a utility's 
costs. This phenomenon arises when production of a good is 
subject to decreasing costs. "Natural monopolies" arise, and 
without government intervention profit maximising behaviour 
by a monopolist would lead to too little output at too high 
a price (s8e Fig.3). Government often supplies goods, such as 
water services, where production is subject to decreasing co s. 
Certain adaptions to pricing policies can be made so th 
the utility covers its costs, but also minimises the losses 
associated with the efficiency objective. The deficit may be 
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PRICE 
o 
FIGURE 3: 
MC = marginal cost 
AC = average cost 
MR = marginal revenue 
AR = average revenue 
A 
Explanation: According to efficiency rules, 
price is set equal to marginal cost, and 
output OA is produced; but at this level, 
average revenue is less than average cost, 
AC 
QUANTITY 
since the average cost curve is still declining, 
and marginal cost must be less than average cost. 
A loss therefore incurred by the firm. However, 
if price is set at levels such as Pac output will 
be lower than OA. 
A public utility will thus seek a pri ng strategy 
which prevents financial losses, but also minimizes 
eff iency losses due to departure from the marginal 
cost pricing rule. 
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financed in a number of ways: from general revenue, by the use 
of two part tariffs, and by rate differenti ion. The cost 
of water supply can be considered as being attributable to two 
factors; variable costs related to volume consumed, and 
fixed costs not related to volume. Many economists have argued 
that the use of a two part tariff would lead to a smaller 
efficiency loss than other pricing policies if the flat fee 
could be kept small so that few potential users are kept 
from participation. Additional charges could then be based on 
the marginal cost priMciple, relating to the costs involved in 
providing various volumes of water. 
already used in a number of areas. 
Two part tariffs are 
Rate differentiation may 
involve differentiation between classes of users, or quantities 
of water consumed. If higher charges are made for the first 
units of water consumed, with lower charges for additional units, 
the efficiency objective may not be met. Consumers may be 
encouraged to consume larger amounts of water without regard to the 
capacity costs they impose on the water servi£e. 
2.3.3 Peak Load pricing 
The demand for water is characterised by extreme variability 
over time. In order to attain efficient resource allocation, 
prices need to be related to the incremental costs of charges 
in consumption (taking into account forward looking costs). 
Equipment has to be designed to meet peak period demands (Table 2). 
Prices based on average costs encourage overutilis ion of 
resources during peak periods, and of peak users subsidise 
peak users. 
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TABLE 2: 
(af Han 1975) 
fACILITY DESIGN HORIZON 
D tribution main ak hour 6.9 
D tribution 
storage and k hour 27.1 
oster pumping 
Transmission rna maximum day 31.1 
Pumpi maximum day 14.3 
Treatment maximum y 3.9 
Sou ee 
ann lIsI 7.6 (reservoir) use (based on safe 
yield) 
TOT/\L .9 
Unsss i 9.1 
Writers such as Hirschleifer et ale (1968) argue very 
strongly for the imposition of marginal cost pricing to bring 
about efficient use of water supplies. Large urban areas 
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present the most intense demand for water, and relatively high 
costs may be incurred in transporting, purifying and distributing 
water supplies possibly gathered at gre distances from points 
of consumption. Increases in water supply capacity may therefore 
be very costly, and there is sound justification for a pricing 
policy which reflects these high costs of providing additional 
capacity. Peak load pricing can be seen as a "modified" form 
of marginal cost pricing which may "smooth out" demand patterns 
and lead to a more efficient use of existing capacity. 
If prices at peak "demand pe ods equate the limited supply 
with demand, then consumers who do not value peak period con-
sumption highly will shift their demand to the off-peak period. 
In some cases it may be argu that where excess capacity exists 
during off-peak periods, it would be inefficient to limit its 
use by charging a price. However, on equity grounds this may 
not be acceptable, since peak consumers may feel that off-peak 
users should not be given a "free ride". 
2.4 EXTERNALITIES AND POLLUTION PR08LEMS 
Social systems rely on rules, techniques and customs to 
allocate scarce resources. Capitalist systems rely heavily on the 
market mechanism and private property rights. However, as has 
already been emphasis ,water is a common-property resource 
which is less amenable to private ownership than other commodities. 
Alchian and Oems z (1973) state that people who have commun 
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rights will tend to exercise these rights in a way which ignores 
the full social consequences of their actions. Externalities are 
unpriced effects which may arise from consumption or production 
activities: the consumption or production of a good by one 
individual or firm may affect the welfare of other consumers, 
or the production of other firms. The essence of externalities, 
whether in production or consumption,is that their costs and 
benefits are not reflected in market prices, and hence the 
decision of the producer or consumer on the level of the ex-
ternality producing commodity does not take into account the 
commodity's external effects. 
In some cases externalities may be beneficial; the 
eradication of garden pests by one householder may also benefit 
his neighbour's garden. Water pollution is a commonly occurring 
example of an external cost. Until recently, many economists 
tended to tre externalities as extraordinary events. However, 
Kneese (1971) argued that externalities need to be treated 
as pervasive and systematic phenomena. 
Pollution arises because the waste disposal capacity of the 
environment is provided free, or at too low a charge. Firms 
seek to dispose of their wastes in a least-cost manner, which 
may involve discharge of wastes into rivers and other water 
bodies. However in most cases, the firm does not take into 
account the costs imposed on downstream users. These costs 
can be considered in terms of opportunities lost (foregone water 
supply or recreational activities), but they may not be measured 
easily in monetary terms (Section 4.2.1). Efficient allocation of 
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water requires that externalities be taken into account. The 
marginal principle applies; that is, net social benefits will 
be maximised when the marginal costs of treating wastes are 
equ to the marginal benefits derived from waste treatment 
(Fig. 4). Market forces in a free economy will result in 
pollution levelB the firm maximises its benefits from 
pollution. 
The Coase theorem (Coase 1960) argu that .economic 
efficiency is achieved regardless of who bears the cost of 
externalities, and that a solution may be obtained by bargaining 
between polluters and those affected. However, Kneese (1971) 
showm that there are several problems inherent in this solution. 
Firstly, the parties involved are generally not equal; and 
bargaining costs may be high. Secondly, a que ion of equity 
arises. In bargaining, each party may feel that they are required 
to pay for a basic right (the right to dispose of wastes, and the 
right to a clean environment). Furthermore, "free rider" problems 
may arise because pollution abatement is a social good. The 
individu self-interest cannot be relied upon to bring about 
the optimum level of pollution ab ement, and the market solution 
to pollution control is ineffective. 
Central and regional government agencies may use a variety 
of m hods to ensure that polluters "internalize", or take full 
account of, their pollution costs. It can be shown that those 
policies which have at least a basis in marginal cost principles 
(reflecting the marginal opportunity costs of pollution) will be 
an effective and efficient means of achieving water quality 
objectives. The advantages and drawbacks of various pollution 
control measures are discussed in Section 2.4.2. 
Ma rginal cos ts 
of treatment 
and pollution 
x 
Mar nal 
treatment costs 
Marginal 
pollut n costs 
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[J A B 
Increasing pollution 
Marginal treatment costs = costs to polluter of 
treating wastes 
Marginal pollution costs = margin pollution damage 
costs to those affected 
by the pollution 
Explanation: The optimal vel of pollution (OA) 
occurs when the cost per unit of waste treatment 
equals the public benefit arising from the 
treatment of the waste unit. Without pollution 
control regulations, producers will maximiz8 their 
benefit from waste disposal, causing pollution 
level DB. This is an inefficient solution, because 
up to point OA, the benefits from waste reduction 
exceed the costs of waste reduction. 
FIGURE 4: The definition of optimal pollution levels 
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2.4.1 The evaluation of costs and benefits associated 
with pollution control 
A knowledge of the costs and benefi arising from various 
levels of pollution control is necessary in order to define the 
optimum level of pollution. However, while certain benefits 
and costs such as the cost of constructing treatment plants 
and the value of commercial fisheries can be readily assessed, 
other intangible benefits such as aesthetic and recreational 
values are less easily defined. In spite of this difficulty 
intangible costs and benefits should not merely be ignored, 
particularly since positive long term increases in the demand 
for environmental resources may be occurring (Knet~ch 1974; 
Gregory 1971). The problem of valuing intangible benefits and 
costs is associated not only with pollution control, but 
with the e imation of the opportunity costs involved when 
water is abstracted for supply purposes. 
Some economists have regarded the problem of valuing in-
tangibles as being insurmountable (Dales 1968). However, 
Baumga (1976) stated that benefits and costs must be "valued, 
not ignored because of difficulties in quantifying them". A 
number of methods for valuing aesthetic, ecological, social 
and recreational factors have been suggested (Thorn and Darby 
1975; Brockshire et al 1976; Stone et al 1970; Howe 1971; 
Kn sch 1974). There are examples of situations where these 
valu ion methods have been applied. Nemerow and Faro (1970) 
estimated the total dollar benefits and costs associated with 
the use of a lake in New York state. The various uses affected 
by water quality changes were studied, and changes in the benefits 
associated with these uses as pollution control varied were 
calculated. 
It is not proposed to give a comprehensive outline here of 
the m hods which can be used to estimate costs and benefits 
of pollution control. However, the availability of such methods 
shows that it cannot be argued that it is impossible to set 
pollution related charges because of a lack of information 
on intangible values. 
2.4.2 Methods of pollution control 
The question of establishing the "bes~fmethods for pollution 
control is a complex one which has been debated by many 
economists (Marshall and Rueg 1975; Kneese 1963; Solow 1971; 
Johnson 1968; Surrey 1970; Roberts 1970; Dales 1968). The 
criteria applied to pricing policies (Section 2.3) are relevant, 
as well as several others. Control strategies need to be: 
i , that is, capable of achieving desired 
water quality levels; 
ii efficient, achieving the water qu ity objective at 
minimum cost; 
iii flexible, capable of adapting to changes in social 
values or costs; and 
iv equitable, with different user groups bearing 
a reasonable share of pollution control and damage 
costs. Furthermore, control measures should provide 
ad uate incentives for improvements in waste treatment, 
and encouragement to use low waste-generating production 
m hods. 
Among the pollution control strategies which have been 
used are financial measures (grants and subsidies), direct 
regulations (such as effluent standards), separate facility 
arrangements (water classification), output taxes, effluent 
charges, licences, and voluntary agreements. Ross (1974) 
compared these methods according to the above criteria, and 
results are presented as Table 3. The Committee on Water 
Pollution Control (1976) also compared various methods, and 
noted that voluntary agreements, while flexible, do not force 
dischargers to abide by an abatement code. The former New 
Zealand Pollution Advisory Council was an example of a body 
which initially used this method to effect water pollution 
control. 
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It is not the aim of this review to carry out an exhaustive 
examination of the advantages and disadvantages of various pollution 
control measures. However, it is notable that only some of these 
methods involve any form of pricing policy. Many policies 
seek to achieve water quality standards by regulation, rather 
than by forcing polluters to internalize pollution costs through 
effluent - related charges. It has already been emphasised 
that society generally accepts as reasonable that the price 
of a good or service should be related to the cost of providing 
it. The price mechanism is thus used to guide individuals 
and firms in their production and consumption decisions. The 
assimilative capacity of water is not a social good, since more 
pollution from one source reduces the assimilative capacity 
available to another source. McIntosh (1977) argued that 
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"on the grounds of common charging practice 
and principles •••• it is difficult to deny that 
there is a case for charging for direct discharges 
•••• but there are immense practical problems in 
introducing such charging systems •••• which could 
well outweigh the possible theor ical advant es. 1I 
These constraints include problems in setting charge levels, 
changing existing sy ems, measuring discharges, and un-
certainties in effeotiveness. Despite these constraints, 
it can be argued that control of pollution through pricing 
policies (the levying of taxes on the basis of effluent 
discharge, or the e of discharge licenses on the open 
market) is the most efficient way of achieving desired water 
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quality standards. Section 5 will examine the extent to which 
New Zealand water management agencies have used pricing policies 
as a means of water pollution control. 
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3. WATER MANAGEMENT IN NEW ZEALAND : THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
In order to consider the policies which control water use 
in New Zealand, some understanding is required of the legal 
and administrative management framework which exists. There 
are a variety of statutes and organisations involved. It is 
appropriate to consider municipal water supply and sewerage 
systems together, since these water uses are adminis red 
under a system largely distinct from that which controls 
abstraction from and discharge to natural waters. Territorial 
local authorities are primarily responsible for munic~pal water 
supply and sewage disposal, while the Nation Water and Soil 
Conservation Organisation, and regional water boards, are 
primarily responsible for the management of natural waters. 
The following sections outline the various statutes and 
institutions involved, with brief descriptions of their functions 
and development. 
3.1 THE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL WATERS 
3.1.1 The legal framework 
The development of an effective management system for 
natural waters has progress from reliance on fragmented pieces 
of legislation to reliance on a comprehensive, rationalising 
water law, the 1967 Water and Soil Conservation Act (Walker 
1975). However, a number of other acts are still relevant, 
and these are listed in Table 4. Also involved are a number 
of local acts (e.g. the Wellington Regional Water Board Act 
1972, the Tasman Pulp and Paper Company Empowering Act 1954) 
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TABLE £'1·: 
(after Cammiss n I' the Env onment 1977) 
Water and Soil Conservation 
Act 1967 (and Amendments) 
Count s Act 1956 and 
Munici 1 Corpo ions 
Act 19 4 
Conservation and 
rs tral Act 
Marine utian Act 1974 
Fisheries Act 1908 
Har urs Act 1950 
e Offences Act 19 
d Draina Act 1908 
Wildlife Act 1953 
Marine Reserves Act 1971 
Public Works Act 1928 
Lake Wan aka Preservation 
Jkt 1973 
Manapouri= 
Development 
Anau 
t 1963 
Control wa qu ity: 
classi c ion; offences. 
Establishment of water boards, 
water ghts, use of under 
ground "Jater. 
Bylaws r local control of 
wa llution; trade waste 
by ; control of er 
supplies and sewsI' works; 
provision for maki c es 
and constructing works. 
Functions of catchment rds; 
erosion and catchment control. 
Oil d charges; ocean dumping; 
penalties. 
er make regulations 
relating to water ut n. 
Dis sal of wastes in 
areas. 
rbour 
provision for penalties 
th is AcL 
ers and functions of 
drainage baa • 
Powers to rna regulations. 
Management of sea and foreshore. 
Construction of works such 
as irrigation s emes. 
cial regulationsa 
Special cond ns for 
development of lakes. 
and some Acts which refer to specific places (eg the Lake 
Wanaka Preservation Act 1973). 
A notable forerunner to the present comprehensive Act 
was the 1953 Water Pollution Act which included a section on 
Trade Waste By-Laws and formed a national advisory council 
on water pollution. The 1963 Waters Pollution Regulations 
were important in giving this council investigatory and 
control powers and functions. 
The preface to the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 
defines its basic purposes as being 
"An Act to promote a national policy in respect 
of natural water, and to make b ter provision for 
the conservation, allocation, use and quality of 
natural water ••• , and for promoting and controlling 
multiple uses of natural water and the drainage of 
land, and for ensuring that adequate account is 
taken of the needs of primary and secondary industry, 
water supplies of local authorities, fisheries, wild-
life habitats, and all recreational uses of natural 
water." 
Prior to the 1967 Act, water rights consisted of the natural 
rights of the land owner, and acquired rights. These rights 
were of use rather than ownership, since water has never been 
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subject to the rules of private property except when appropriated 
and taken into possession. The 1967 Act invested in the Crown 
all rights of use in respect of natural water (Williams 1975), 
that is 
"the sole right to dam any river or stream, 
or to divert or take any natur water, or discharge 
natural water or waste into any natural water, or 
to use natural water". 
The Act defines the structure of the National Water and 
Soil Conservation Organisation (Fig. 5) and the functions of 
both the Organisation's various components and the regional 
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NATIONAL WATER AND SOIL CON RVATION AUTHORITY 
Function: nat nal cy ma r 
an water and so cans rvaticn 
SOIL CONSERVATION AND 
RIVERS CONTROL COUNCIL 
WAT RESOURCES 
COUNC IL 
Func n:-control and prevention 
of erosion; 
-research and ta 
collection; 
-investiga ons and 
demon tions; 
-rivers control 
drainage 
viced by 
Fune 
and 1 Oiv ion 
n:-allocation of 
natural water; 
research and 
advisory; 
'- t.la t ar resou rce 
inventory; 
-water quality; 
-water classification, 
M of and Development 
REGIONAL WATER BOARDS 
semi-autonomous bodies 
func on: responsible for 
menting the policies 
th councils at the 
regional level. 
Figure 5: 
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water boards. It also defines the two major avenues by which 
control of water use may be exerted: that is, by classification, 
and the granting of water rights. These are briefly described 
in the following paragraphs. 
a) The Act promotes a sy em for 
the classification of natural waters in New Zealand; that is, 
"a declaration of the minimum standards of 
quality at which the natural water so classified 
shall be maintained in order to promote in the 
public interest the conservation and the best use 
of that water." 
The process of defining classifications has been delayed because 
of Town and Country Planning Appeal Board decisions against a 
number of classifications. 
b) The w er right system provides 
considerable control over most operations involving water use, 
including the abtraction, damming and diversion of natural 
waters, and the discharge of wastes into natural waters. 
Except for certain uses defined in the Act (the taking of 
water for domestic, stock, or fire-fighting needs) or in 
the General Authorisations instituted by the regional water 
boards, or a few special case~ all prospective users are required 
to apply for a water right. Such applications are processed 
and granted by regional water boards, except in the case of 
Crown applic ions which are granted by the National Authority. 
Both processes are subject to appeal to the Town and Country 
Planning Appeal Board. 
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3.1 .2 
The role of the regional water boards lies primarily. 
in carrying out the provisions of the 1967 Act and Amendments. 
As well as processing applications for water rights, the 
boards are responsible for performing surveys and formulating 
water allocation plans. 
When considering an application for the discharge of wastes, 
the board is required to balance competing interests by taking 
into account the possibility and cost of alternate methods of 
disposing of the waste in question, or of abstracting it 
from the effluent prior to discharge. Where the application is 
for the right to take water, the applicant must show the extent 
to which the use of the water applied for will be beneficial to 
him, and due regard must be given to other uses and future 
demands. It is required th the regional water boards also 
safeguard recreational needs, scenic and natural features, 
fishing, and wildlife (Williams 1975). 
The only provision for charging under the Water and 
Soil Conservation Act occurs in relation to the granting 
of water rights. Firstly, Regulation 4(i) of the Water and 
Soil Conserv ion Regulations 1968 requires that every 
application for a water right made under Section 21(3) of the 
Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 is to be accompanied 
by a fee of $4. Section 24(2) of the Act states 
"The reasonable expenses and costs of the 
Board and of the applicant and other parties to 
the application shall be borne as the Board may 
direct or left where they fall. Provided that 
the Board may, if it thinks fit, require payment 
of a deposit ainst expenses and costs before dealing 
with an application, and may reserve its decision in 
respect of final allocation of expenses and costs 
for separate consider ion and decision when 
ascertained. 1I 
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Thus the applicant may be held liable for at least some of the 
costs incurred in processing the application. A board may 
also require some form of deposit from those objecting to 
the granting of a right. In October 1977 Parliament approved 
the introduction of regul ions which allowed an increase in 
the fee mentioned above from $4 to $30. Furthermore, the 
Amendment Bill also allows water boards to charge an annual 
fee of up to $10 to each holder of a water right. At the 
time of writing these amendments have not been incorporated 
into water board policy because the regulations governing 
them have not been released. 
The only situation in which powers are given to a board 
to charge directly for amounts of water abstracted from natural 
waters occurs under the Wellington Region Water Board Act 
1972, where this board is able to charge for groundwater 
abstr ions in the Hutt Valley region. However in relation 
to other groundwater, section 9 of the 1973 Water and Soil 
Conservation Amendment Act states that: 
"Nothing in any bylaw made under Section 4 of 
this Act shall authorise any Board to make a charge 
against or levy upon the owner or occupier of any 
land in respect of any natural water taken on the 
land or from any bore on the land." 
In relation to offences against the Act, Section 34 of the 
Act states that where unauthorised use of water takes place 
"every person who commits an offence •••••• is 
liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding 
$2,000, and if the offence is a continuing one to a 
further fine not exceeding $100 for every day during 
which the offence continues II and that 
"the court may direct that such portion of the 
fine imposed as the Court may deem necessary shall 
be paid to any body or person (not being a local 
authority or public body to which section 109 of 
the Public Revenues Act 1953 applies) to cover any 
costs incurred by that body or person in removing, 
burying, or otherwise disposing ofar neutralising 
the effects of any discharge which gave rise to the 
offence. 1I 
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The Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941 allowed 
Catchment Boards to levy an administr ive rate on the capital 
value of all rateable property within its area. When the 1977 
Amendment to the Act comes into force, the maximum allowable 
rate will be 0.05c in the dollar. It is notable that when 
Catchment Boards acquired the functions of regional water 
boards under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, no ex~ra 
provision was made for funding. Some regions that have low 
valuations have been unable to obtain sufficient revenue to 
meet all "administration II costs and the National Water and 
Soil Conservation Authority has had to supplement income of 
those regions by providing grants. For the financial years 
from 1971/72 to 1975/76 grants totalling $2,543,000 have been 
approv 
3.2 THE PROVISION OF WATER RELATED SERVICES 
3.2.1 Water Supply 
3.2.1.1 Municipal water supplies 
In 1975, approximately 87% of New Zealand's population was 
served by public water supplies (Board of Health Report 1975). 
Territorial local authorities have the right to construct and 
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maintain such water supplies under the terms of the Municipal 
Corporations Act 1954 and the Counties Act 1953. For example, 
section 240 of the Municipal Corporations Act states that: 
"The Council may con ruct waterworks for 
the supply of pure water for the use of the 
inhabitants of the di ct ••••• and may 
keep the same in good repair ••••• " 
A comprehensive water supply and sewerage and sewage 
disposal subsidy scheme, administered by the Department of 
Health, encourages the provision of main water supplies. The 
scheme provides for subsidies in two categories; firstly, on 
the principal content of charges for loans raised prior to 
1969, and secondly for water supply, sewerage and sewage disposal 
proposals (Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on the 
Financing of Local Authority ~orks, 1975). Subsidies for 
the latter are at the flat rate of $1 for $2 after the deduction 
of a basic cost fa or of $5 per head of the population served 
by the scheme (although the deduction did not apply to initial 
sewerage reticulation schemes). At 31 March 1974 more than 
103 local authority water supply projects had been approved 
for assistance under this scheme, with a total subsidy approval 
of $4,473,207. 
Subsidy assistance is restricted to the residential content 
of works, and hence any industrial content is deducted from the 
estimated scheme costs before being considered for subsidies. 
Local authorities are also expected to recoup costs from 
subdividers whenever reasonable (sections 3518 and E of the 
Municipal Corporations Act 1954, or section 27 of the Counties 
Amendment Act 1961). 
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The above two Acts both cont n provisions for charging 
for water supplied. Three s arate systems for financing water 
supplies exist: separate rates, metered consumption charges, 
and uniform charges. The Acts specify the maximum rate in the 
$ which may be levied, and the limit of the minimum charge which 
may be s There is also provision for half-water rates to 
be levied on properties which are capable of being, but are 
not connected to the water supply. Section 95(3) of the 
Municipal Corporations Act 1954 states that: 
"Instead of levying a rate •••••• the Council 
may, by special order, 
a) make charges in respect of the ordinary 
supply of water, according to the quantity of water 
consumed by any person receiving the same as measured 
by meter, of such amount as may ••• be fixed •.• or 
agreed on ••• , or 
b) •••••• make a uniform annual charge in 
respect of the ordinary supply of water as may ••• 
be fixed." 
Similar provisions for half-rates and minimum rates apply. 
Councils may also make charges for "extraordinary" uses of 
water, within the meaning of any by-law defining that use 
(fo r exampl e, sp eci charges for showers, baths etc installed 
in buildings other than dwelling houses). 
3.2.1.2 Rural and irrigation water supply 
A special subsidy scheme applies for rural water supply, 
providing subsidies towards the cost of pip water supply 
to rural areas. This scheme is administered by the Ministry 
of Works and Development. Subsidies are also available for the 
construction and maintenance of irrigation water supply, under 
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the control of the National Water and Soil Conservation 
Authority, which established a national policy on irrigation 
supply in the early 1970's. Local irrigation committees were 
set up to investigate new schemes and approve existing 
schemes. Proposals are investigated by the Ministry of Works 
and Dev opment on the basis of their engineering and 
agricultural feasibility, and economic and water resource 
studies. Smaller systems may also qualify for assistance by 
way of loans. 
An article in Soil and Water (Anon 1977) stated that: 
lithe policy of successive governments has been 
to increase charges annually to recover operating 
and maintenance costs of schemes, and later, interest 
on a proportlon of the capital costs involved." 
Charges for older irrigation schemes are being reviewed. 
The same article states that: 
lIIrrigation schemes developed more recently 
in the Waitaki Valley and at Hawea have provision 
for their water charges to be adjusted to meet 
operating, maintenance, and interest charges, 
once their construction and development period 
has been completed." 
This is in contrast to past policy where Government has 
carried the capital costs of schemes, and the balance of the cost 
in supplying water to farms in irrigation areas. All irrigation 
proposals are subject to water right application procedures. As 
most applications to take water for large schemes are made by 
the Crown, such applications are commented on by the regional 
water board involved, but granted by the National Authority 
(refer to 52.1.1). 
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3.2.2 
3.2.2.1 General charges 
The provision of sewerage services is subject to similar 
control and incentive procedures as outlined for'municipal 
water supply. Under the Counties Act and the Municipal 
Corporations Act, councils may make provision for the 
drainage of their district, may construct and repair drains, 
and may levy charges for these services. A separate drainage 
rate may be made, subject to a maximum rate in the dollar 
(rateable value) and a maximum allowable minimum charge. Instead 
of levying such a rate, a uniform annual charge can be made. 
The uniform charge often relates to the number o:F water clos s/ 
urinals contained in a'building. Similar allowances 8S for 
water supply are made where properties may be, but are not, 
connected to a public drain; in such cases a half-rate or 
half annu charge may be levied. 
As outlined in the section on water supply, subsidies 
are available to local authorities for the provision of sewerage 
services, under the Health Department's Water Supply/Sewerage 
and Sewage Disposal subsidy scheme. 
3.2.2.2 Trade wastes charges 
Under the 1967 Water and Soil Conservation Act, local 
authorities may make special charges on wet industries for 
sewerage services provided. Section 26 L of the Act states that: 
"Any local authority may make by-laws not 
inconsistent with this Act ••• with respect to 
the discharge of any trade wastes ••• from trade 
premises into any sewer controlled by the local 
authority." 
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Under such bylaws, the following may apply: 
a) industry may be required to notify the local 
authority of the volume, composition and discharge of its 
wastes; 
b) periods of the day during which wastes may be 
discharged may be determined; 
c) injurious components must be removed. 
The Act makes specific allowance for charges to be made. 
Section L states that local authorities may 
"require the occupiers of trade premises from 
which trade wastes are discharged into a sewer to 
pay to the local authority such charges ••• as may 
be specified ••• for the reception of trade wastes 
into .the sewer, and the disposal thereof, regard 
being had to the composition and volume of the 
trade wastes ••• and to any additional expense 
incurred or likely to be incurred by the local 
authority in connection with the reception or 
disposal of the trade wastes." 
However, there is some restriction on the rights of the 
local authority to make charges. Charges must 
a) be necessary for the treatment of wastes to reduce them 
to a state equivalent to the average strength or quality of 
domestic sewage normally discharged into the sewers of the 
authority; or b) be in respect of the reception and disposal 
of excess sewage from trade premises. Trade waste charges 
must also take into account any by-product recovery by the 
local authority, and are not permitted to exceed the costs 
involved in waste treatment. Certain premises may in fact 
be exempt from charges if the local authority wishes to 
"encourage industryll. There is also provision under the 
Act for industry to appeal against charges imposed. In 
certain cases, local authorities may, with the approval of 
the Minister, enter into specific cost-sharing agreements 
with cert n industries. 
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4. SURVEY OF CHARGES FOR THE USE OF WATER AND 
WATER - RELATED SERVICES 
In order to ascertain how the charging provisions of 
47 
the Acts involved in water management were actually implemented 
by various local government bodies, a postal survey of 19 
regional water boards and over 60 other local authorities was 
carried out (see Appendix I for survey details). A smaller 
number of agencies, primarily in the Auckland area, were 
visited. The local authorities surveyed included all cities, 
a number of suburban local authorities in Auckland, Wellington 
and Christchurch, a number of drainage and sewerage boards, and 
a smaller number of county councils. The aim was to focus 
on those areas where a significant proportion of the population 
was likely to be provided with water supply and sewerage 
services, and where some sort of policy on trade waste 
disposal was likely to have been developed. 
Replies were received from all authorities surveyed in 
the Auckland area, and most cities, but there were lower 
rates of reply from the borough councils and county councils 
in other areas. Hence a large proportion of the information 
cont ned in the following sections relates to the Auckland 
area, although this is not meant to imply that the implementation 
of charging policies is any "better" or "worse" in this area 
than in others. 
4.1 CHARGES MADE BY REGIONAL WATER BOARDS 
Appendix II summarises most of the information received 
from regional w er boards, although further information 
relating to charges made by the Auckland Regional Wa r Board 
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TAB 5: 
i) 
TV CA GOR 5 
1 ($75) 2($125) 3 ($ 200 ) SPECIAL 
Take IJater, less than More than Municipal 
dam 400 cubic 400 cubic supply 
m/day m/day 
NO T 
TakeThermal Ves F 
water 
APP LI CAN T 
D charge Under 8 ha Over 8 MEETS 
stormwa 2 CO S 
(subdiv ion) 
D arge Ves 
I'm waste 
r~inor waste- Yes 
we r 
dischar 
Other t.,aste Yes 
discharges 
ii) 
Similar the above except that: 
a) $30 catego y used for minor ke water ghts, ea d 
farm wastes, d arges from sma subdivisions, and 
diversion for I'm rovsments. 
b) Instream uses of water may be treated in the $30 cate ry 
or as a cial case, which app cants meet reason Ie 
costs. 
oJ 81 authori ations (no fee) are given for sma lac 
authority stormwa dis arges and tic nkse 
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and the Taranaki Catchment Commission is shown in Table 5. 
It is clear that a fairly wide variation exists between 
the maximum and minimum fees levied for water right applications 
($200 and $15). Most boards, however, have charges in the 
range of $20-$30. Although not evident from the Appendix, 
there is also Variation in the types of water use for which 
no fee is charged; that is, those covered under general 
authorisation. While some general authorisations are 
nationally supported, some boards fe that general 
authorisations commit the board to a particular approach 
on matters of detail before enough is known of problems 
that may arise (Walker 1975). 
Those boards. which have a graded scale of charges for 
different types of applications intend that these should 
reflect the costs involved in processing the application. 
The general view held is that applications for discharge 
rights usually involve higher investigation costs. However, 
there is certainly no standardized view of the way in which 
costs incurred in investigations should be allocated. Many 
boards charge applicants for costs incurred only in ex-
ceptional circumstances, for example, when a special tribunal is 
held. The Southland Catchment Board charges applicants only 
for costs incurred in holding the hearing. When industrial 
cases are under consideration, full costs of the hearing are 
charged against the applicant. In other cases, the Board may 
sorb some of the costs. The Rangitikei-Wanganui Board, 
on the other hand, base their standard application feel 
deposit of $38 on the average cost incurred in processing 
rights. This Board keeps a tally of investigatory and 
process costs for a right, and if these costs e~ceed $38, 
the excess is charged to the applicant. However, the 
Manawatu Catchment Board pointed out that a major problem 
lies in di inguishing between those investigations relating 
specifically to the applications, and those related to water 
resources management generally. 
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There are a few boards which have not yet formed a policy 
of recovering costs from applicants. It is notable, however, 
that a number of other boards have recognised the costs 
involved in processing water rights, and are currently 
considering the question of who should bear these costs. 
There is a trend towards acceptance of the principle that 
users should pay for the services which they receive. It is 
likely that the increased fees which can now be made by 
boards ($30 application fee and $10 monitoring fee) will 
significantly alleviate the immediate financial problems 
encountered by many boards. 
4.2 WATER SUPPLY CHARGES 
Charges, and other information relating to water suppl~ are 
outlined in Appendix III. The charges referred to are the charges 
actually levied on the ultimate consumers of water (occupiers/ 
owners of property) within a local authority area. However, 
in many cases the local authorities are not themselves 
responsible for the initial supply of water, but merely 
for the distribution, within their area, of w er supplied 
by a central water authority. In the Auckland area, the 
Auckland Regional Authority acts as the central supply 
authority, while the Wellington Regio~al Water Board performs 
this function in the Wellington area. The Wellington Regional 
Water Board has also taken over the water distribution 
functions of the Wellington City Council. Both agencies 
charge local authorities for bulk water supplied. 
A high percentage of municipalities surveyed use 
separate charges or rates for water supply (Table 6). 
Many local authorities have instituted universal or limited 
metering systems, charging for water on the basis of 
metered consumption (Table 6). This is particularly 
evident in the Auckland area, where all consumers (except 
domestic consumers in Auckland City, and some in Waitemata 
City) are metered and charged primarily on the basis of con-
sumption. The Municipal Association of New Zealand noted in 
a paper on separate r es and charges for services (1970) 
that there is a specific historical reason for the metering 
of water supplies by Auckland municipalities, since w er 
was originally supplied in bulk by the Auckland City Council, 
and charged for on a gallonage basis. This made charging 
by metered consumption the obvious system for the area. 
However, for authorities outside the Auckland area, 
annual charges and separate rates are a more commonly used 
revenue-gathering device for domestic consumers than metering. 
The survey carried out by the Municipal Association in 1970 
revealed a similar trend, with 19 of the 24 surveyed 
authorities having universal metering being in the Auckland 
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TABLE 6 
-
Separate rates and charges for water supply 
Consumers 
a) Domestic Other 
I~umber levying separate charge 37 40 
Number without separate charge 3 
Number of replies received: 40 40 
b) Basis of charging for water Domestic Other 
Separ e rate 10 
Uniform annual charge 5 
M ered consumption 18 35 
Combination system 4 5 
37 40 
TABLE 7 Separate rates and charges for sewerage services 
General rate 
Separate rate 
Annual charge 
Trade waste charges 
No trade waste charges 
Number of authorities 
20 
9 
5 
34 
24 
10 
34 
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area. In many cases a separate rate is levied, calculated 
on a rateable value (capital, unimproved or annual) basis. 
A minimum annual charge is often set. In other cases, the 
water rate is also the minimum charge, and metered charges 
are applied on water consumed above the amount allowed by 
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the value of the rate. Where there is no universal metering, 
meters are frequently installed on residential properties 
which have private swimming pools. 
Annual charges vary from a minimum of $15 to a maximum 
of $34. The separate rate levied varies from .138¢/$ to 
.2¢/$, although unfortunat y many authorities did not 
specify wh her this rate was levied on unimproved value 
or capital value~ Tha Municipal Association (1970) noted 
that there is prOVision within the Rating Act to levy 
separate rates on different systems of rating from the 
general rate, although their survey revealed that only 11 
municipalities had taken advantage of this provision. 
Information provided by the present survey was insufficient 
to confirm whether this number had increased. 
In nearly all areas surveyed, industrial and other 
large consumers such as hospitals and schools are metered 
(Appendix IIi) and charged according to metered consumption •. 
Again,some form of annual charge or minimum charge may be 
applied as shown by the "combined" systems in Table 6. 
Commercial users are m ered only in some areas. In 
municipalities such as Christchurch City and Lower Hutt 
City, half water rates are levied on commercial premises. 
If the users draw more water than the half water rate 
entitlement, they then pay according to extra consumption. 
There is considerable variation among charges levi 
on industry. In a few cases, (mainly provincial centres) 
only large consumers or water-based industry are m ered, 
while others pay separate rates or annual charges. Metered 
consumption charges vary between 25¢/1000g and $1/1000g. 
In a few cases, a form of declining block schedule operates. 
The Auckland City Council levies a reduced water rate where 
consumption exceeds 40 million gallons per quarter, on a 
seasonal basis. Usually only the freezing works qualify 
for this concession. Similarly Mt Roskill Borough, One Tree 
Hill Borough, and Wanganui City state that they reduce 
charges as consumption increases, although the quantities 
involved are again so large that only very large consumers 
would benefit from reduced rates. 
Other special provisions relating to industrial and 
commercial premises exist. For example, in Upper Hutt 
City general rates on industrial and commercial properties 
are, by virtue of the differential rating system, higher 
than those on residential properties. Such consumers are 
therefore allowed to use 1000 m3 of water each year free 
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of charge, with any quantity in excess of that amount being 
charged for. Special agreements may exist between the local 
authority supplying water, and ~arge consumers. In Invercargill, 
parties to the Bluff pipeline agreement meet a proportion of 
pipeline costs. 
4.3 
Many authorities allow a reduction in charges to 
institutions such as schools and churches. This reduction 
varies between areas; a 16.5% reduction in Wanganui City, 
12% in Ellerslie Borough, 10% in Howick Borough, and un-
specified reductions in other areas. There are a number 
of other examples where the rate charged varies according to 
use: for example, in Napier, where the Harbour Board and 
Harbour Board shipping pay higher rates than ather commercial 
enterprises. 
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Some data on water consumption was also gathered and this 
is presented in Appendix TIL Unfortunately there is a lack 
of standardization between different authorities in the 
way that consumption ~easurements are recorded. The most 
easily comparable results are those from the Auckland area. 
The significance of consumption levels will be discussed in 
Section 5. 
The survey also revealed that separate rates and charges 
sometimes do not cover the entire costs of water supply. 
Fot example, Invercargill City meets 20% of the total cost 
of water supply from general rates. 
CHARG FOR SEWERAGE SERVICES 
4.3.1 General charges 
As for water supply, local authorities use a variety of 
means to recover costs incurred in providing sewerage services. 
AppendiX IV outlines data obtained from survey respondents. 
It is evident that fewer authorities use a separate 
rate or charge for drainage/sewerage services than for 
water supply (Table 7). This was also revealed in studies 
carried out by the Municipal Association (1970) and the 
Territorial Local Government Council (1975). The latter 
survey showed that while 41 out of the 46 councils (city, 
borough and county) surveyed levied separate rates and 
charges for water supply, only 16 levied a sepa e rate 
or charge on sewerage/drainage services. However, some 
councils may not have provided these services. 
To some extent, the type of charge made is determined 
by the way in which the service is provided. While some 
authorities manage their own sewerage and sewage disposal 
.services, in several cases these services are provided by 
separ e ad hoc authorities which levy constitutent local 
autho ties. The Auckland Regional Authority, North Shore 
Drainage Board, and Hutt Valley Drainage Board levy local 
authorities on a per capita basis. 
Board, on the other hand, rates on 
The Christchurch Drainage 
the capital value 
of properties within its district. Separate rates are 
levi for sewer maintenance and sewer loans. The five 
local authorities involv collect rates on behalf of the 
Board. 
Unfortunately only two separate rates were specified, 
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these being .12¢/$ for Invercargill City, and .21B5¢/$ rateable 
value for Wellington City, although a number of other authorities 
do levy such rates. The basis on which uniform annual charges 
a~e made varies between authorities. Annual charges per 
dwelling or business unit range between $23 and $35. However, 
annual charges are also made on the basis of the number of 
Wc/urina1 units, and these charges range between $9.50 
per unit and $40 per unit. Again, the charges levied do not 
necessarily reflect the cost involved in providing the 
service, since the costs of drainage/sewerage services are not 
always covered by the separate charges made. 
In some cases, connection and disconnection fees are 
charged. A number of authorities also charge subdividers 
for the cost of sewerage systems, or require that the sub-
dividers install such systems. 
4.3.2 
Wet industries are charged both on the basis of trade 
waste charges, and on rateable value where separate rates are 
assessed. However, in the latter case, separate rates may 
be offset again trade waste charges. 
The trade waste charges reflect the additional costs of 
treating trade waste as compared to domestic sewage from a 
property of equivalent rateable value. The actual amounts 
charged by various organisations are set out in Table 8 • 
The Auckland Regional Authority bases its charges on the 
percentage contritiution that trade wastes make to the loading 
on the treatment plant (Table 9). Costs thus reflect that 
suspended solids and b10chemica1 oxygen demand (800) levels 
from trade wastes are proportionally higher than those from 
domestic sewage. Charges levied by the Inverc~rgi11 City 
Council are formulated on a similar basis. 
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AUTHORITY 
Auckland Regional 
Authority 
North Shore Drainage 
Board 
Christchurch 
Dr nage Board 
Invercargill City 
CHARGES 
Volume: $20/g/minute/annum 
Suspended solids: $210/100lb/day/annum 
BOD : $400/100lb/day/annum 
14.5¢/1000g 
Volume: $8.49/1 /minut e/ annum 
Suspended solids: $7. 25/kg/day/annum 
Biochemical Oxygen demand: $9.08/kg/day/annum 
1 1 BOD + S8 ( Monthly charge =12 x 2 (PBOO PSS) AD + AL) 
PBOO plant design BOD load 
PSS = plant design SS load 
AD = Annual operating cost (= $65, 576 for 
1976-77) 
AL = Annual capital cost (= $73, 954 
1976-77) 
for 
TAB 9: 
(af Gummer, & comm,,) 
fair C rge to Indust for use of System 1973/1974 
Domestic flow 116 6 d 
Tra wastes d 10.9% 
tic Flow '~5. 4 d 84.3% 
Trade wastes d 15. 7j~ 
Domest U 
549,510 po 
at 0 .. 103 
56,6001b 42.2% 
n 
day 
Trade wast s (by 77, 
deduction) 
Domest e 61,178 
549,510 pulation 
at Do 167 x 2/3-¥, 
Trade wastes ,55R 
* 1/3 removed by sedimentat n. 
57.8% 
50.7% 
Tra was char re calcu ted on the bas 
that trade wastes cont ibute the above rcen 
loadin s each category. Costs ri table 
to aa category are c lated on a separate slso 
Approx tely 31.4%, 34.9%, and 
tre tment costs ar a ribu 
pend Solids, and 800 res 
.7% of total 
Volume, 
ctively. 
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The North Shore Drainage Board stated that current 
charges were set some time ago, and are due for revision. 
A trade wastes charge in the vicinity of 36¢ per thousand 
gallons is probably more realistic. Revision of the Hutt 
Valley Drainage Board charges is also taking place. 
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In other areas, prOVision for trade waste charges may be 
made by specific agreement between the local authority and the 
indu ry concerned. For example, the Timaru City Council 
levies an annual charge on the local freezing works as a 
capital contribution to the main sewer outfall ($1,770 in 
the year ended 31 March 1977). Similarly, an agreement exists 
between the Dunedin Drainage and Sewerage Board and the 
Roslyn Mills for the payment of trade wastes charges. 
5. DISCUSSION 
This discussion will relate charging practices followed 
in I~ew Zealand to: a) the theory described in Section 2,and 
b) overseas practices. Recommendations will be made as to 
where pricing policies could and should be implemented and 
improved upon. 
It is true that the situation in New Zealand regarding 
both water supply shortages and water pollution is not as 
severe as in some areas in Europe or North America. With 
New Zealand's shorter rivers, and the frequency of waste 
discharge to coastal waters, water is probably not used and 
reused to the same extent as for example the Thames, where 
sewa effluent makes up 14% of flow, and the Rhine, which 
contains 40% treated effluent at average flows. Solutions 
to water shortages and pollution problems which are viable 
overseas may not be viable in New Zealand, and this dis-
cussion will attempt to point out how such overseas solutions 
might be adju ed to New Zealand conditions. 
5.1 WATER SUPPLY 
As has been discussed in Section 2.2, water for supply 
purposes cannot be treated as a pure social good. 
Consumption is rival, and sale to particular consumers is 
possible. Water supplied through municipal reticulation 
systems can be sold, and direct charging may be appropriate. 
However, water supply services cannot usually be provided 
efficiently through private firms for reasons of decreasing 
costs ( ction 2.3). Furthermore, water supply services 
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have certain "merit good" elements. It has been asserted 
that distributional considerations should be allowed for 
in pricing decisions, recognizing that certain services, 
or levels of service, should be provided on a subsidized 
basis. However, it has also been stated fre quently that 
subsidization may be an inefficient means of achieving 
income distribution objectives, depending on whether the 
products in question weigh more heavily in high-income or 
low-income budgets. These factors will be taken into 
account in the following discussion. However, it will 
be argued that water supply services should primarily be 
considered as private goods. Above a certain level of 
water consumption ne~essary for the maintenance of health 
(adequate water for cooking, hygiene), water is not an 
"essential" good. The benefits obtained from such higher 
levels of consumption are essentially private, without 
significant spill-over benefits occurring. It will be 
shown that the financing of water supply services on the 
basis that water is a "merit" good will provide neither 
efficient nor equitable solutions to water allocation 
problems; the application of marginal cost principles to 
water pricing is a preferable alternative. 
A consideration of overseas charging principles shows, 
however, that marginal cost pricing is far from being a 
common phenomenon, both for reasons of technical and 
administrative feasibility, and political acceptability. 
It is true that experience in the United states and 
Europe has demonstrated the beneficial effects of metering. 
Flat rate charges for water use can be considered as an 
open invitation to waste, since there is no incentive to 
correct leaks and generally to make more efficient use of 
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water. A flat rate assumes that consumers are homogenous 
with respect to both quantity consumed and cos of water 
supplied, and hence the price of additional water units to 
the consumer is zero. 
In contrast, metering makes consumers aware of the 
amounts of water consumed, and relates charges to use. 
A few writers, such as Lobb(1975~ have claimed that domestic 
consumers are not responsive to price changes. Price is 
not the only factor important in determining demand for 
water; however, Hanke and Flack (1968), Young (1973) and 
Morgan (1973) show that price has a gnificant effect. 
The initial psychological effect of meter installation is 
important, as illustrated in Fig. 6, though Gallagher 
and Robinson (1977) stated that "whi universal metering 
is a prerequisite to the introduc on of an effective water 
price policy, the installation of meters per se does not 
guarantee an efficient use of wa 
WATER 
CONSUMED 
(g) 
Introduction 
" 
TIME 
FLAT 
TE AREA 
METERED 
AREA 
FIGURE 6: Effect of meter installation on demand in 
Boulder, Colorado 
(Hanke and Flack 1968) 
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Reduced demand means that capital costs can be reduced, 
and operating and processing costs lowered. Of course, 
these benefits do have to be weighed against the costs of 
installing and maintaining metering equipment. The National 
Water Commission (19 ) suggested that~in the United states, 
the introduction of metering and increases in water prices 
may also have effects on the use of water~using applicances, 
encouraging the use of modified appliances. 
A number of American water utilities have instituted 
"two-par t tar i ff s" to 0 vercome the pro ble ms enco untered 
due to declining water supply costs. Consumers frequently 
pa y a "lump sum" charge in addi tion to pa y ing for meter ed 
water consumption. H~nke (1975) pointed out that, although 
universal metering has been implemented in a number of 
areas in the United states, pricing has tended to be on 
the basis of average historical costs. 
in Section 2.3, the demand for water 
However, as argued 
ds to be varia ble 
over time and space, so average cost pricing leads to an 
ineffic nt use of resources where peak users subsidize 
off- peak users. 
Some American utilities have attempted to overcome the 
problems of peak demand by instituting peak cost pricing. 
Afifi (1969) noted the need for pr ing policies to smooth 
load patterns, and suggested a two-part seasonal rate, 
which incorporated a seasonal ra and a per unit rate. 
To a certain extent, particularly in dry areas,su6h 
seasonal rate differentials exist. For example, in El 
Paso" Texas, the water utili ty raise d summer water rates 
( ong with a consumer education programme in which awards 
were given for low water-using landscaping) to achieve 
reductions in summer water demand. Similarly, Leversedge 
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(1974) and Hogarty and MacKay (1975) found that drops in 
peak demand occurred where peak load pricing was instituted. 
Even more soph ticated means of charging for peak demands 
are now being developed. Feldman (1975) suggested a form 
of metering which would allow peak hour or maximum day 
pricing. This meter would operate through res~onsive 
rate var tion or pressure sensitivity; however, techno-
logical factors would make meter installation and maintenance 
costly. The writer has not found any examp of the imple-
mentation of such a scheme. 
In contrast to peak load pricing, some utilities have 
ignored marginal cost principles in implementing declining 
block tariffs for water consumption (that is, water rates 
per unit decrease as consumption increases). Hirshleifer 
et ale pointed out that such rates were undes able from 
the point of view of economic efficiency. However, 
attitudes are changing. Recently, a number of water 
utilities have proposed increasing block tariffs which in-
clude a "life-line" block at a cheaper rate which is intended 
to cover basic needs. This takes into account "merit good" 
aspects of water supply, ensuring basic health and welfare 
standards. 
Furthermore, Keller (1977) noted th utili ties ha VB 
begun to recognize the substantial financial burden that 
new water connections impose on existing users, and 
connection fees are being adjusted so that more of the 
cost is being borne by the new consumer. However, Keller 
so points out that in some cases, such increasing charges 
have been politically unacceptable. 
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In the United Kingdom, far less use is made of metering 
for domestic consumers; charges tend to be made on the 
basis of rateable val ue (Gill iland 1977). The pri nciple 
of "parity" is still in use; that is, charges for measured 
consumption are fixed so that the income per 1000 gallons 
of water supplied by meter is the same as the income per 
1000 gallons supplied to unmetered consumers in aggregate. 
There is some conflict in the United Kingdom as to whether 
demand control through price is acceptable. Some water 
utilities still argue that "a publicly owned, technic 
monopoly is obliged to meet all demands" (Water Research 
Centre Symposium Proceedings 1977). 
In Austra'lia, charges for water supply are generally 
made on the basis of property value. The commercial 
sector pays a significant contribution towards the revenues 
received by the water authority, because property valuation 
in the central business district tends to be higher than 
elsewhere, while this sector represents only a small 
proportion of total water consumption. Recently a number 
of studies on water pricing policies in New South Wales and 
Victoria have been carried out. Gallagher and Robinson 
(1977) suggested that a two-part pricing policy would be 
suitab in Australia. There would be a fixed annual charge, 
which would include a payment for the provision of fire 
fighting service capacity, and a price per unit of water 
consumed. 
What then is the situation regarding charging for water 
supply in New land, and how does it compare with overseas 
practice? Background information on water charging is set 
out in Sections 3 and 4, and Appendix III. 
An Auckland Regional Authority internal report (1976) 
stated that the water supply objective of this authority 
was "to make bulk water available as and when it was 
demanded by customer local bodies", and that capital works 
programmes were drawn up accordingly. A similar water 
supply philosophy has been held by many other supply 
authorities. However, it is now recognized, at least by 
some water suppliers, that a reappraisal of water supply 
philosophy is required, particularly in view of the much 
higher costs often involved in meeting additional demands 
for wa ter. 
It is notable that none of the local authorities 
surveyed, except perhaps the Auckland Regional Authority, 
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had given much consideration to the use of pricing policies 
as a means of regulating demand. Firstly, the financing of 
water supply through general and separate rates means that 
charges bear no direct relation to the amounts of water used. 
Under this system there is no incentive for consumers 
practice water conservation measures. If it is accepted 
that water is a private good, and that users should be 
charged according to quantities consumed, then it needs 
to be considered whether rateable value is a reasonable 
proxy for water consumed, and the costs that a user imposes 
on the water supply system. 
As has been pointed out, the costs of supplying water 
vary markedly with time and space. Obviously, a property's 
rateable value does not necessarily bear any relation to the 
peak demands which a consumer exhibits, nor to the costs of 
supplying water to the property. Considerable cross-subsid-
ization may occur between rate-payers, particularly where 
differential rating systems do not take account of water 
supply costs. For example, it has been shown that it is 
generally cheaper to supply water in more densely settled 
areas, and that smaller properties tend to use less water 
for irrigation and gardening purposes. However, if a 
higher rate is struck on inner ci ty properties wi th lower 
water supply costs, or if inner city properties tend to 
be higher in value, then these properties may well subsid-
ize suburban rate-payers who may both use more water, and 
require costly water supply systems. This feature was 
recognized by the Upper Hutt City Council, which gives a 
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free water allowance to more heavily rated commercial prop-
erties. Where water supply is financed on a rateable value 
basis, consumers who use water wastefully, have appliances 
which consume large amounts of water (for example, dishwashers, 
waste disposal units), or who fail to check for water leaks, 
are subsidized by other ratepayers. 
If water was considered to be a merit good then it is 
true that financing through rates does not lead to socially 
undesirable reductions in water use, since charges are 
not related to amounts of water used. However, the consid-
eration of merit goods often involves the question of direct-
ing such goods towards the poor (Musgrave and Musgrave 1973). 
It needs to be recognized that rates tend to be regressive 
in nature, so that even if distributional considerations are 
to be allowed for in p cing decisions, a regressive rate 
structure would not ach ve an objective of subsidizing 
lower income individuals. 
On the other hand, it might be true that other means 
of raising water authority revenue, such as xes based on 
income, would be even less desirable from an efficiency 
viewpoint, unless it could be shown that water use was 
re ted significantly to income. Gallagher and Robinson 
(1977) showed in their Australian study that in-house water 
demand could be related to income, although they did not 
es blish this relationship for out-door domestic uses. 
In th model, they used numbers of taps, showers, washing 
machines and toilets as a wealth-income proxy. However, a 
study by Howe and Linaweaver (1967) showed an inverse 
rela onship between income and water demand in some areas. 
There have been no studies undertaken in New Zea nd of this 
nature, so it is not possible to say what impact income 
has on water consumption. 
The annual charges made by some authorities may to 
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a certain extent reflect water usage, particularly if related 
to numbers of toilet units, baths or showers. However, a flat 
annual charge assumes that all users impose the same costs 
on the water supply system, which a highly unlikely event. 
Those who consume small amounts of water, and exert low 
peak demands on the system, subsidize consumers of larger 
amounts. A few authorities in the Auckland and Wellington 
areas do try to lessen the subsidization effect by metering 
domestic rate yers likely to consume ge amounts of water, 
for example, those with swimming pools. An argument has been 
put forward that increases in annual charges may result in 
increases in consumption as ratepayers attempt to "get their 
money's worth out of the system." 
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Metering as a means of charging for water supply is 
widely used in New Zealand for commercial and industr 1 
users and, to a lesser extent, for domestic users. There are 
marked variations between charges, and in some areas charges 
may not meet the costs of supply. It has been emphasized 
by a number of writers that it is not sufficient to me y 
install meters; charges per unit need to be meaningful and 
to reflect the costs of supply if there is to be any 
influence on consumer demand. 
In some areas in New Zealand, there have been consider-
able decreases in water consumption with the introduction of 
metering. Mansergh (1970) reported a 50% reduction in 
consumption after water supplies in Onehunga Borough were 
fully metered, while Parkinson Cowan Lt (1976) noted marked 
decreases in consumption after the introduction of metering 
in parts of Tauranga County. Once consumers are aware that 
charges are related to water consumed, they are more likely 
to adopt water conservation measures, and also to ensure 
that water is not lost in inefficient distribution systems. 
In New Zealand, more than 10% of water supplies may be"los t" 
in transmission from sources to consumers. 
It is somewhat difficult to determine the exact relation-
ship between price and consumption levels. The Auckland 
Regional Authority has attempted to relate domestic consumption 
in their area to charges per unit. However, it must be 
recognized that consumption per head is also related to 
factors such as family size, property size and climate. 
I t would ap pear that in Auckli3n d, the only unme tere d area 
(Auckland City) has a markedly higher consumption per head 
than other areas. De Cour cy (1976), in an Auckland Regional 
Author y survey, noted that the lowest consumption per head 
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occurred in Waitemata City, which so had the highest 
charges. It is somewhat difficult to compare current con-
sumption figures from the survey of local authorities because 
of the ck of standardisation of returns. Some authorities 
differentiate between domestic and other uses, while others 
do not. However, it is clear that on a nation-wide basis, 
authorities without domestic metering had considerably higher 
domestic consumption figures than authorit 
metering (Gummer 1976). 
with universal 
Economic theory suggests that most eff icient use of water 
will occur when prices reflect the marginal costs of water 
supply. There are only a few examples of declining block 
structures, one of which (Auckland City Council) does take 
into account seasonal differences in the availability o~ water. 
Generally within New Zealand charges for wa supply, whether 
related to metered consumption or not, are based on historical 
aver age costs and hence do not cops u.lith. the problems of peak 
demand. Even where consumption is metered, costs may be 
subsidized from the general rate. As a result, even metered 
charges do not reflect the costs of additional supply sources 
and consumers have no incentives to reduce peak demands. 
Arguments against metering have asserted that low income 
families would be forced to reduce consumption to unaccep bie 
levels in terms of health standards. However, the American 
concept of "1ife-line"rates would appear to cope with this 
problem, and presumably could be implemented fairly readily 
in areas with domestic metering. Special allowances are 
already made by some authori s such as Wanganui City, 
Howick and Ellerslie Boroughs, for churches and schools, 
which may receive water at a lower rate than other consumers 
(Appendix III). Water here seems to be treated as a "merit 
goo d II in th it is being suppl iEd for pur pos es deeme d to 
be socially and culturally des a • Whether or not th 
is a suitable method of public assistance of education and 
religion somewhat open to debate; but provided the 
subsidization does not encourage wasteful use of water, 
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can be justified on the basis of its social value. It may in 
fact be more socially and polit ally acceptable to provide 
such subsidization than to provide general financial aid. 
Some other charging principles used in New Zealand can 
be justified in terms of promoting efficient wa use. 
For example, the charging of unconnected properties for 
the ava ability of water supply encourages the full 
utiliza on of reticulation systems. The fact that sub-
dividers must meet some or all of the costs of reticulation 
systems means that there ss subsidization of new connect-
ions by existing consumers. 
The provision of central government loans for water 
supply purposes also gives recognition to the fact that the 
provision of safe, clean water supplies can be considered as a 
na onal objective. However, it is true that the availabil-
ity of such loans may make the construction of extra supply 
capacity an "easier" ternative than other methods of 
equating supply with demand, such as the regulation of demand 
through pricing policies or the encouragement of water re-use. 
In particular, so long as the maintenance of public health 
standards is deemed to be all-important, it may be difficult 
for local authorit s to introduce wa r re-use schemes. 
There are many areas for improvement of water charging 
systems in New Zealand. Of course, the administration and 
technical costs of implementing metering systems must be 
weighed carefully against the benefits of reductions in 
demand for new ca city. In some cases it may well be that 
such costs outweigh the benefits. However, in view of 
the rapidly esc ating costs of providing new supply, 
there are sound reasons for local authorities to 
investigate very carefully the feasibility of universal 
metering. 
There are other alternatives to the introduction of 
metering: flat rate charges could be made on a -per capita 
basis. Th system has been investigated in Britain, 
where it was found that the admin trativ8 costs of 
changing from an exist~ng, workable system were too high 
in comparison to the likely efficiency benefits. It quite 
probable that the same argument would hold against the 
introduction of per capita charges in New Zealand. 
Many areas in New Zealand already have parti metering, 
and most of the Auckland area has universal metering. In 
these areas, there is scope for the introduction of ak 
demand charges. It is clear from the restrictions which 
have to be applied over dry summe~, and a comparison of 
peak to average demands, th a peak loading prob m does 
exist. It is not suggested th the highly soph ticated 
forms of metering suggested by Feldman (1975) are as yet 
economically or technically feasible. However, even a two-
stage summer / winter rate could alleviate some of the demand 
problems, particularly if applied to large consumers such as 
Domestic consumers would probably so need 
some form of education programme. This approach has already 
been suggested in an Auckland Regional Authority report 
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(1977) which stated that: 
"An active water conservation programme to acquaint 
the public and industry with the problems and costs 
associated with increasing water consumption, and 
the promotion of conservation measures would help 
to alleviate water supply problems." 
The same report suggested that it might be desirable to 
alter bulk pricing structures so that consumption above 
"normal" requirements was charged out at an increased rate. 
Gummer (1976) stated that "prices should be maintaine~ at 
a level high enough to discourage excessive demand". 
However, as Johnson (1968) argu ,an increase in technical 
efficiency through misuse of the price system does not bring 
about economic efficien~y. A very careful assessment of 
the marginal costs of water supply, and the administrative 
cos of peak load pricing (for example, additional metering) 
would need to be made before an authority made any decision 
to implement seasonal or ak load pricing. 
One final point about current water charging systems 
in New Zealand is that these do not reflect the opportunity 
costs of foregone uses of water. In contrast, there is 
provision under English law for water to be priced at least 
partly in terms of water resource scarcity. Water supply 
authorities have to compete with other users for available 
natural water, but unless costs inflicted on other users are 
taken into account when considering the expansion of supply 
capacity, an authority may not be sufficiently encouraged 
to investigate other supply sources such as waste water 
treatment and re-use. 
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5.2 SEWERAGE AND SEWAGE DISPOSAL SERVICES 
As for water supply services, it can be argued that 
sewerage and sewage disposal services should be treated as 
a private good. However, certain external benefits arise 
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in that the maintenance of a cert n level of public health 
cna be considered a social necessity; the benefits from the 
use of sewerage services are not entirely private. Even so, 
it can be shown that the treatment of sewerage services 
essentially as a private good, with some allowances for merit 
goods ( as for water supply pricing), will ensure the most 
efficient use of the service. 
The theoretical arguments for charging are again based 
on marginal cost pricing; ideally users should be charged 
in accordance with the costs their wastes impose on disposal 
and treatment systems. Thus charges usu ly need to be 
related to both quantity and quality of wastes released. 
5.2.1 Domestic sewerage services 
In general, the financing of domestic sewerage 
services has not been on a "user-pays" basis. Historically, 
sewerage services have been regard ed as an "essential" 
public service, where charges should not be related to 
provision of the service. In Australia and B tain, the 
financing of sewerage systems has relied heavily on charges 
made on t basis of rateable value of properties. Rees 
(1977) pointed out that th involves a considerable degree 
of cross-subsidization between users , since Gommerc 1 
premises in central city locations may pay a disproportionate 
amount of total costs. Raes estimates that for Austral n 
cities~ the removal of this subsidy would result in a 30% 
increase in domestic charges. A similar charging system 
exists in Canada. 
In New Zealand, most local authorities finance 
76 
sewerage services from general or special rates (Appendix IV). 
It is not possible to draw any relationship between rateable 
value and the use of sewerage services, and hencs consumers 
are not charged for the amount of the service they consume. 
The costs of providing sewerage services vary between areas, 
and thus there is probably a considerable degree of cross-
subsidis ion between users, as in the Australian example. 
As for water supply, to the extent that sewera services 
should be considered as merit goods, this method of financing 
does not discourage use of the. service. However, it also 
does not discourage wasteful or excessive use of sewerage 
services, and since rates are regressive in nature, would 
not meet accepted income distribution objectives were 
these held to be an obje ive of sewerage service pricing. 
It is so notable that sewerage rates are based on average 
historical values rather than "forward looking" costs. 
Flat rates for the prOVision of sewerage services 
are also fairly common overseas; however, these involve 
zero unit prices, and usually are low charges based on 
h torical construction costs. In New Z nd, flat charges 
may be made on a per-dwelling basis, as in Devonport Borough,. 
or on the basis of the number of toilet units, showers and 
baths, as in Tauran and Porirua Cities. Charges made on 
the latter basis are probably somewhat more equitable, in 
terms of relating the incidence of benefits to the cost of 
providing the servic than are rateab value basis charges. 
However, there is a significant difference between 
the amounts of waste generated by different households, 
based on household size, the use of appliances such as 
waste disposal units, and other factors such as roof area 
(De Courcy pers. comm.). Flat rate char s do not take into 
account these differences, or provide any incentive for 
waste reduction. 
A number of other bases have been suggested for annual 
charges. Stormwater runoff, which can contribute a major 
pollutional load to drainage systems, is related to imperm-
eable areas. Hence it has been suggested that impermeable 
area should form a basis for annual charges. Per-capita 
charges, or charges for the use of certain household appli-
ances , could be made (Lester 1977). All these are theor-
etical possibilities; however, a distinct advantage of 
present charging systems is that they are simp ,and 
easy to enforce. Charging on the other bases mentioned 
would involve considerably increased administration costs 
which could well outweigh the efficiency benefits of 
implementing the charges. 
The costs of providing new sewerage connections are 
considerable, and although subdividers may meet some costs, 
ex ting users also help to meet the cost of sewerage system 
expansion. Downing (1973) has pointed out that effective 
pri ng of new connections can be a means of implementing 
ur n growth policy. For examp ,connection fees could 
be increased in lower density areas where the cost per 
household of providing services was higher. Some local 
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authorities in New Zealand char undeveloped properties, 
through general or special rates, for availability of access 
to sewerage services, and this policy would seem to encourage 
the more efficient use of available systems. However, if the 
size of the charge is low, as it seems to be in several areas, 
consumer choice may not be affected by it. 
In the preceding section on water supply, the use of 
income based charges mentioned. Such charges could be 
justified if it could be shown that the use of sewerage 
services was related to income. 
It is generally agreed that the cost of measuring 
and monitoring discharges from individual households would 
be technically difficult and prohibitively expensive, even 
though it is feasible for wet industriss (Rees 1977). 
However, there is a relationship between amounts of water 
consumed, and amounts of water discharged to sewerage systems. 
An Auckland Regional Authority internal report (1976) stated 
that in Auckland "approxima ly 75% of all bulk water finds 
its way into ARA sewers". Most planning for water supply 
has paid little attention to the consequent demand on other 
services such. as drainage. However, some Auckland authorities 
are now considering a joint pricing philosophy for water and 
drainage. A few other countries have already recognized the 
relationship between water and wastewater. For example, in 
Japan, wastewater disposal and treatment taxes are payable 
on the basis of water consumed (OECD 1977). 
Certainly charges made on the basis of water consumed 
would reflect sewerage system use more closely than flat 
rate charges or property rates. They would encourage both 
water conservation and lowered waste production. Ideally, 
these costs would reflect the costs of increasing waste 
disposal capacity, It might be possible, in addition, to 
levy some form of surcharge on excessive waste generating 
systems such as kitchen waste disposal units. Universal 
metering would be necessary for such a system to be eff-
ective. 
The availability of government subsidies in New 
Zealand for the construction of sewerage services again 
reflects that certain public benefits arise from such 
services. The maintenance of public health standards is 
held to be a social necessity, which ~stifies the provision 
of subsidies. However, the encouragement of efficient 
sewerage system use through user charges need not conflict 
with the public healthobjective, particularly if"lifeline i1 
rates, as suggested for water supply charges, are adopted. 
It is notable that such Illi feline" rates might need to be 
related to household size in order to avoid charging 
excessive amounts to larger families. This could present 
administrative problems, particularly in contrast to most 
pre se nt char gi n g sys tems, which ar e comme ndable in terms 
of their ease and simplicity of administration. 
In summary, if local authorities are to encourage 
the efficient use of sewerage services, then charges need 
to be related much more closely to use made of the service. 
Water consumption would seem to be an adequate indicator 
of sewerage system use for most domestic consumers. 
5.2.2 Trade wastes charges 
In the case of industrial concerns, the use of 
pricing policies is somewhat different. It is generally 
agreed that industry should meet the cost of sewerage 
services provided to it, and charges for trade wastes 
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usually follow this philosophy by making charges on the 
basis of the quantity and quality of wastes. 
Drainage authorit s in both Europe and America levy 
charges on the volume and strength of wastes. In the Neth-
ands, charges are related to chemical oxy n mand (COO) 
and the concentration of nitrogenous substances, with an 
additional levy on heavy metals. The French base charges on 
suspended solids levels, COD, and biochemical oxygen demand. 
Flat rate charges are also applied to certain industries, 
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where a relationship between pollution and the quantity of 
ouput, or some other measure of activity, has been established. 
Sewerage taxes may also be based on water consumption. 
There are a number of examples in the American liter-
ature of trade waste char introduotion or increase 
bringing about considerably decreased waste loads (Downing 
1973; Elliott 1973;Ethridge 1973; Gelb and Myers, undated). 
In some cases industry has been encouraged to implement changes 
which result in net savings in production costs, even with 
surcharges included (Ethridge 1973). The introduction of 
processes such as water recycling may help firms to reduoe 
water supply charges as well as waste disposal charges. 
At ast one large wet industry in New Zealand has 
been encouraged to implement waste treatment techniques 
because of sing trade wastes charges. The company involved 
has in fact achieved a net production gain through the use 
of water re-cycling and by-product recovery. The response 
of industry to rising trade waste charges will, however, 
depend upon the flexilility of production processes. 
Gelb and Myers (undated) and Hartford(1976) commented that 
fast growing industry, with a relatively rapid infusion 
of new production facilities, could react more readily to 
trade waste charge increases than slower growing industry. 
Trade waste char~es made in New Zealand do nd to 
reflect the costs of processing industrial wastes. Rates 
are often based upon the proportion of the sewage load 
contributed by industry (for example, in Auckland and 
Invercargill). Even so, domestic ratepayers may in some 
cases subsidize wet industry. For examp ,the Auckland 
Regional Authority services a population of 600,000, and 
an equivalent trade waste load of 840,000 persons. 
However, total charges paid by industry amount to consider-
bly less than half of the total cost of sewerage system 
operation. Furthermore, charges are based on average 
historical costs, and do not reflect the rapidly increasing 
cost of providing extra treatment plant capacity. Whether 
or not wet industr s shOUld be subsidized is open to 
debate. More realistic charging policies may not cause 
undue hardship to industry_ They may in fact cause industry 
to reconsider their water use and waste discharge po cies, 
with the possibility of achieving a net financial gain. 
The administration costs involved in the vying of trade 
wastes charges may not be particularly high, especially if 
it can be shown that waste discharges are related to water 
consumed. There is a sound argument for authorities not 
currently levying trade wastes charges to reconsider 
the feasibility of doing so, particularly in the light of 
rapidly ascala ng construction costs. 
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The National Water Commission (1973) stated that "user charges 
levied on industrial users of municipal w e treatment plants 
offer promise not only of fairly distributing waste treatment 
cos ,but 'of radically reducing the quantities of industrial 
waste discharged, and of reducing the costs and complexities of 
municipal plant oper ions". 
However, it must be recognised that while trade waste 
charges may achieve the above objectives, in most cases they do 
not reflect the costs imposed on individuals and the public 
through the discharge of municipal wastes to water bodies such 
as rivers and estuaries. Decreased water quality will limit 
the availability of water for other uses, and failure to reflect 
this phenomenon in muni.cipal sewage disposal charges means that 
services are underpriced. This problem will be discussed further 
in the following section. 
5.3 THE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL WATERS 
The man ement of water bodies in their IInatural ll state 
differs somewhat from the situations already discussed where 
authorities are responsible for providing a service, be it water 
supply or sewerage services. Bodies such as New Zealand's 
regional water boards are responsible for ensuring that pollution 
and water abstraction are controlled at an acceptable level. 
Various countries have different definitions of what that level 
should be, but there seems to be a growing acceptance of the 
!luser-pays" principle, in that polluters or abstractors should 
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have to pay for their use of water. This implies an inherent 
acceptance of the idea that the benefits of water use for 
commercial enterprises are essentially priVate, accruing to the 
individuals who use the water rather than the general public. On 
the other hand, it is generally believed that water should 
be made available without charge for recreational uses such 
as fishing. 
A wide variety of pollution control methods have been 
applied overseas, and there is still debate as to which 
of these allocates water most effi ently and equitably. 
Commonly used to control discharges are systems of licences, 
permits, and prohibitions, which are often based on emission 
standards. In some cases standards involve outright bans 
(e.g. the Canada Fisheries Act, which prohibits discharging 
into waters "frequented by fish"). More often andards specify 
maximum values for discharges of waste (France, Canada, United 
states, Netherlands). In France and Canada, special emission 
standards are set for different industries. Many countries 
recognise the relationships between water quality management and 
quantitative policy. A bill being introduced to levy financial 
charges on wastewater in Germany is pa ly intended to achieve 
concurrently a relative reduction in the quantities of water 
abstracted. In New Zealand, there is prcrvision within the relevant 
Acts for water management authorities to specify levels of 
discharge quality and quantity based on individual situations. 
A process of directly regulating emissions is folio-wed. 
Another policy used has been the water classification or 
"separate facilities" approach. Quality categories in France 
and Japan are based on the possible uses of water. In the 
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United states it was found to be too difficult to correlate 
effluent limits with environmental quality. However, pollution 
restrictions are more severe when receiving waters are to be used 
for water supply purposes or recreation. It is notable that 
strict emission standards may be waived if the discharger can 
show that there is no reasonable relationship between the extra 
waste treatment required by the stricter standards and the 
resulting benefits derived. This approach is also used in 
New Zealand, although it is too early as yet to determine whether 
it will be effective i~ achieving desired water quality standards. 
Classification systems probably do not have all the drawbacks 
envisaged by Ross (1974). In New Zealand classification has 
taken into account present use, and the number of situations 
where polluters would have to shift or greatly increase treatment 
costs is probably small. 
In 1972 the Council of the DECO adopted the "Polluter-Pays-
Principle"; that is, that the polluter should be made to meet 
the costs of pollution control and prevention measures, and 
should be given incentives to reduce pollution by moving towards 
less polluting products and technologies. An DECO pUblication 
(1977) reports that all the DECO countries have adopted the 
"Polluter-pays-Principle", and are now applying it in different 
degrees. One aim has been to keep application of the principles 
as simple as possible; however, damage functions are often 
hard to define in monetary terms. 
Draft legislation in Germany has attempted to create 
a feedback between the amount of effluent discharged and the 
fees p d. Imhoff (1974) reports that, in Germany, industry 
which discharges directly to rivers pays on the basis of its 
pollution load. The income from effluent charges is used to 
pay for additional water pollution control measures such as 
wastewater treatment, impounded lakes, or instream aeration. 
Discharges so require a licence which may demand specific 
effluent standards. Imhoff also stated that: 
"long experience of the water associ ions has 
shown that effluent charges are a practical way to 
at least collect money from a polluter and to finance 
equalizing measures ••••• moreQver the effluent charge 
may cause a polluter to treat or pr reat the wastewater 
if the relative costs are advantageous." 
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In France, charges are made under basin- agency programmes 
which have an ultimate aim of equating private costs (the 
payment of charges or expenditure on water treatment) with 
social costs (damage prevented or compensated). Charges are 
collected from, and revenue is distributed among, users who 
require action by the basin authority or benefit therefrom. 
Subsidies may be given to industry for treatment purposes. 
Oi ribution of collected charges takes into account the relative 
amount of damage caused; the cost of operations is borne by 
polluters and water consumers. Similar charges are levied 
in the Netherlands, where levies on discharge into state waters 
are redistributed in the form of grants towards the investment 
costs of treatment plants. Regulations in Finland compel polluters 
to bear the cost of reducing pollution or compens ingfor any 
damage caused; an indemnity may be paid to victims of damage. 
A similar system exists in Japan. 
In contrast, while British river basin authorities 
are able to levy charges for direct discharges , they control 
water pollution primarily on a regulatory basis. Simila y 
there is a general lack of finan al charges in the United 
states and Canada, although schemes for pollution charges 
are being developed. Under the effluent charge scheme in 
Calgary, Alberta, firms which agree to treat their own wastes 
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are reimbursed all effluent charges collected during the previous 
three years. 
New Zealand law makes no provision for effluent fees of any 
kind, although fines have been set for discharges which con-
travene regulations. However, as Fish (1973) noted, "recourse 
to the law is a wholly inadequate means of ensuring efficient 
and effective pollution control ••••• but is an essential 
background requirement". In New Zealand, few water pollution 
prosecutions have taken place; and even when charges have been 
proven, fines have tended to be small. Some water boards feel 
th the time and administrations costs involved in bringing 
about a prosecution are simply "not worth it". Knetsch (1973) 
suggested that in the long run, regulation may depend on voluntary 
compliance. 
Economic theory would suggest that the comb in ion of pollution 
control measures used in New Zealand are far from optimal. That 
strategies are not entirely effective is demonstratable from the 
growing incidence of pollut waters. Direct regulations do not 
recongise the different costs of achieving standards from 
different sources. On the other hand, direct regulations are 
administrativ y more simple because their information costs are 
lower than for other types of control measures. It could well 
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be argued that the present system is only beginning to operate 
successfully, and that further changes would involve unreasonable 
administrative and information costs. 
From an economic point of view, however, direct regulations 
are neither efficient nor equitable as a means of allocating water 
resources. If it is accepted that the internalization of costs 
is a desirable feature of control measures, it is clear that 
this is not achieved by present strategies. The public often 
meet on undue share of damage costs, particu rly in cases where 
discharges are not subject to water board control (discharges 
from metropolitan sewage works may be exempt from such control). 
Of course, the sudden implementation of effluent charges might 
not be politically feasible. They may not even be feasible in the 
long run, although many w ters have emphasized that there are 
better ways of subsidising certain industries than through a 
lack of charges for effluent disposal. It cannot be denied that 
effluent fees would have the desirable features of encour ing 
lower waste production, and providing a source of revenue to 
carry out IIclean-up" programmes. There are problems in settin optim-
al pollution JBU3Js am discharge fees, particularly when many of 
the costs associated with increasing pollution are "intangible". 
However, methods of estimating these costs are being developed 
(Section 2.3.1), and the problem cannot be dismissed as 
insurmountable. There are sound arguments for New Zealand water 
management authorities to take a searching look at effluent 
charging strategies applied overseas, particularly in Germany 
and the Netherlands. Even if information constraints require 
that charging for pollution be implemented on a simplified basis, 
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any move towards cost internalization would be an improvement 
on present policies. 
There are a few other solutions to pollution control 
problems,such as output taxes and auctioned licence~ which 
have been suggested by economists. The writer has been unable 
to find any existing examples of licence strategies, even though the 
purchase of discharge licences through the open market is held to 
be economically efficient and effective. The Environmental 
Protection Agency (1971) commented that the purchase of 
assimilative capacity through licences raised objections about 
"the equity of selling a publicly owned good to a 
private interest, the difficulty of making allowance for 
public waste discharges, and the monopoly position 
potentially provi~ed to any bidder who might wish to corner 
the market for waste discharges in a particular watershed." 
On economic grounds, these reservations can be dispelled; it is 
assumed that firms will buy licences up to the point where it is 
cheaper for them to treat wastes, so a monopoly position need 
not arise unless it reflects the best allocation of waste dis-
posal capacity. There are no firm grounds on which to treat public 
waste discharges differently from private discharges if the only 
"merit good" aspect of public sewage treatment facilities is the 
maintenance of public health. There would seem to be a con-
tradiction in objectives if authorities seek to maintain low 
municipal disposal prices for public health reasons, on one 
hand, while polluting natural water bodies on the other. However, 
it is true that a successful licencing scheme has high information 
costs, since it would need to consider the proximity and times 
of discharge of pollutants, as well as quantities discharged. 
89 
Most of the policies discussed so far have dealt with point 
sources of pullution. New Zealand water management legislation 
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makes no explicit provision for the control of non-point 
pollution sources such as agricultural fertilizers, which 
may be major factors in the degradation of some New Zealand 
lakes. Taylor (1975) proposed a re6ional market for rights 
to use fertilizer which would operate in much the same way as a 
market for pollution licences. This strategy could be useful 
where catchment areas were small, or at least easily definable, 
but again would probably present unreasonably high information 
costs, and could be politically unacceptable as well. 
The regulation of water abstraction requires a somewhat 
different approach, although again it is true that the benefits 
of industrial and municipal water use (subject to the provisos 
in Section 5.1) are largely private. The costs which users 
impose upon others are often "intangible"; but nevertheless, 
strategies can be developed which estimate these costs and 
formulate charges accordingly. The benefits arising from charging 
realistic prices for water abstraction are similar to those arising 
when users pay marginal costs of water supply; that is, charges 
promote efficiency in water use. 
In the United Kingdom, charges paid for water abstracted 
from rivers or groundwater sources are based on the source of the 
water, the season, the use made of it, and the kind of water 
discharged. Martindale (1977) states that: 
"it is obvious that someone who abstracts water 
from a surface source only in the winter imposes a 
far smaller burden on resources than in summer, and 
sensibly charges should reflect this". 
Furthermore the charges reflect the quality and quantity of 
water which is returned. For example, there is a distinction 
between once through cooling water where there is little or 
no deterioration in water qu ity, as compared to water 
discharged as sewage. There is also provision in the 
English Water Resources Act for special weightings 
to be applied whenever exceptionally high abstraction rates 
over a pa icular period sevem~ tax a particular source 
of supply. 
Some water boards in New Zealand have already advocated 
charging for water on a quantity taken basis, both as an 
encour ement of water conservation, and a means of finance 
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for water boards. Already, in certain areas, those abstracting 
significant quantities of water are required to meter their 
use for management purposes. It is likely th there would be 
significant reaction against the implementation of charging, 
particularly from farmers who consider it their "inalienable 
right" to draw water for farm purposes. However, with the 
number of conflicting uses now competing for water, it would 
seem essential that the most efficient use is made of available 
water. A particular conflict is evident between irrigation and 
recreational uses. Charging could provide a source of revenue 
to provide or enhance alternative recre ion areas. Information 
and administrative problems do arise, but are probably not 
as severe as the problems encountered in pollution control. 
Water boards should be encouraged to investigate possible 
methods of implementing a charging policy for water abst ion, 
bearing in mind that charges should reflect a region's 
water resource situation. 
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Charges made by regional water boards currently do 
little to encourage w er conservation measures. Many boards 
effectively subsidise the costs of granting a water r ht by 
charging fees ($15 - $30) far below investigation costs. 
Other boards are adopting a "user-pays" pOlicy for application 
charges. Again this does little to affect quantities of 
water used, although it would appear equitable that those 
who intend to make significant use of a water resource should 
bear the costs of investigations initiated by their applications. 
The introduction of the new monitoring fee seems to be 
only a means of g hering revenue. There is a wide variation 
in the costs of monitoring various water rights, and a 
standard fee does not reflect this variation. To a certain 
extent, it is in the public interest that rights should be 
monitored, and hence it can be argued that the public should 
bear some of the costs of monito ng programmes. However, 
it can also be argued that those whose activities bring about 
high monitoring costs should pay on the basis of costs 
incurred. This should be used as an incentive for firms 
who contravene water right conditions to improve their 
performance, particularly in cases where complaints are 
received. Future reviews of legislation should bear in mind 
the above factors, particularly the introduction of a pricing 
policy as a supplement to current legislative controls. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the 
comparison of water management strategies used in New Zealand 
with those used overseas, and with the relevant economic theory. 
1. Water and water services should be treated essentially 
as private goods, although recognition should be given to 
the externalities arising from water use. 
2. Economic theory shows that the most efficient means of 
allocating water is through pricing policies which are 
based on marginal cost principles. Current methods of 
financing water services through rates and annual charges 
appear to be neither .efficient nor equitable. 
3. Observations both overseas and within New Zealand 
demonstrate that the implementation of universal metering 
leads to more efficient use of water resources. Local 
authorities currently without universal metering should 
investigate the administrative and technical feasibility 
of implementing such a scheme. 
4. I~etering alone does not necessarily encourage efficient 
water use, and needs to be accompanied by a realistic pricing 
policy which reflects marginal supply costs. New Zealand 
data illustrates the variability of demand over time. The 
implementation of some form of peak load pricing, particularly 
seasonal pricing, could bring about major increases in 
the efficiency of water supply system use. 
5. The recognition of the need for consumer educ ion 
regarding water use by bodies such as the Auckland 
Regional Authority is commendable. To be effective, 
pricing policies must be of a form which can be readily 
understood, and acted upon, by the public. 
6. The measurement of domestic wastes on the same 
basis as trade wastes does not appear to be technically 
or administratively feasible. However, studies in New 
Zealand indicate that there is a measurable relationship 
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b ween water consumed and water released to sewers. Local 
authorities should investigate the possibility of charging 
for sewerage services on the basis of water consumed, since 
it is likely that charges made on this basis would lead to a 
more efficient use of sewerage systems. 
7. Trade waste charges appear to be a reasonably efficient 
and equitable means of recouping the costs of industrial 
waste collection and treatment. Local authorities should 
ascertain that these charges ~eflect the costs of increasing 
system capacity. 
8 Existing rategies for the management of natural 
wastes appear to be lacking in a number of respects. 
i) While water right applications fees cannot be 
expected to serve as a means of regul ing water use, they 
should reflect, nevertheless, the costs of processing 
water right applications. Boards currently using flat-
rate charges should examine the alternative systems used by 
the Auckland and Taranaki Water Boards, and the Rangitikei-
Wanganui Water Board, both of which are preferable to flat 
rate charges from the economic point of view. 
ii) The new monitoring fee is likewise of little use as 
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a management tool. It is unlikely to bear any relation to the 
costs of monitoring individual rights, and therefore appears 
to be an inequitable charge. If user charges for water 
abstractions were instituted, monitoring costs could be 
reflected in these. 
9. Economic theory demonstrates that the control of water 
use by regulatory methods does not encourage water conservation 
practices, and may not lead to least-cost solutions to water 
pollution problems. It has been shown overseas that 
regulatory methods may often be ineffective in achieving 
water use and water quality obje ives. Water and soil 
legislation should allow water boards to levy charges 
based on quantities of water abstracted and the quantity and 
quality of water discharged. There would need to be flexibility 
in these charges to allow for regional differences in demands 
for water. 
10. Until such time as charges for water and water-related 
services adequately reflect the opportunity costs involved 
in any particular use of w er, management bodies cannot 
expect to achieve an economically and socially optimal 
allocation of water resources. 
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GLOSSARY 
w er-dwelling life forms (plant and 
animal). 
in the economic sense, refers to 
achieving a given objective at minimum 
cost (social and private costs). 
"fair" or IIjust", according to a 
pre-determined objective, which 
may be in terms of either to-pay, 
or benefits received; see Section 2.3. 
external costs and benefits see externalities. 
externalities 
groundwater aquifers 
unpriced effects which may arise from 
consumption or production activities; 
see Section 2.4. Also referred to as 
external costs or benefits; spillover 
costs or benefits. 
underground rock formations containing 
water in recoverable quantities. 
phenomena which may lead to the 
inefficient allocation of resources 
if the market mechanism is relied upon. 
Examples include 
as pollution; 
such 
consumption. 
goods where consumption by one 
individual confers benefits on other 
individuals; Government may deem the 
provision of such goods to be desirable, 
and provide them low cost. See 
Section 2.2 Examples: education, public 
health services. 
situation where a good or service is 
produced by only one producer. Public 
utilities such as electricity, water 
supply are frequently "natural monopolies' 
private goods 
wet industry 
because of the decreasing cost 
structure of the industry. 
97 
goods whose consumption benefits are 
enjoyed by only one individual; 
individuals can be excluded from the 
consumption of priv e goods, usually 
through the price mechanism. 
See Section 2.2. 
goods which involve non-rival con-
sumption e.g. clean air. Usually 
individuals cannot be excluded from 
the consumption of social goods. 
See Section 2.2. 
see externalities 
a commonly used term to describe 
industries which use large amounts 
of water in production processes. 
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- SURVEY OF LOCAL AUTHORITY CHARGES 
The following local authorities and regional water 
boards were rcularized. Slightly different question 
formats were used for different authorities, depending 
on the questions which were applicable (e.~ drainage 
authorities were only questioned about drainage/sewerage 
charges). 
1 Regional water boards 
a) 
Auckland 
Bay of Plenty 
Hauraki 
Hawkes Bay 
Manawatu 
Marlborough 
Nelson 
North Canterbury 
Northland 
Otago 
Poverty Bay 
Rangitikei-Wanganui 
South Canterbury 
Southland 
Taranaki 
Waikato Valley Authority 
Wairarapa 
Waitaki 
Westland 
Wellington 
b) Information requested 
x 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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1 Fees and deposits required for water right applications 
2 Differentiation of fees on the basis of the type of 
water right. 
3 Allocation of investigation costs incurred which were in 
excess of the applicant's deposit. 
4 Fees and/or costs paid by other parties to water 
right applications (e.g. objectors). 
2 Local authorities 
a) Local authorities circularised 
Auckland City 
Birkenhead Borough 
Christchurch City 
Devonport 
Dunedin City 
Eastbourne Borough 
East Coast Bays City 
Ellerslie Borough 
Gisborne City 
Glen Eden Borough 
Hamilton City 
Hastings City 
Henderson Borough 
Howick Borough 
Invercargill City 
Kaipoi Borough 
Lower Hutt City 
Lyttleton Borough 
Manukau City 
Mt Albert Borough 
Mt Eden Borough 
Mt Maunganui Borough 
Mt Roskill Borough 
Mt Wellington Borough 
Napier City 
Nelson City 
New Lynn Borough 
Newmarket Borough 
New Plymouth City 
Northcote Borough 
Onehunga Borough 
One Tree Hill Borough 
Otahuhu Borough 
Palmerston North City 
Papakura City 
Paparua County 
Papatoetoe City 
Petone Borough 
Porirua City 
Riccarton Norough 
RotorlJa Borough 
Rotorua County 
Takapuna City 
Taupo Borough 
Tauranga City 
Tawa Borough 
Timaru City 
Upper Hutt City 
Replies 
x 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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Waimairi County 
Waitemata City 
Wanganui City 
Wellington City 
Whangarei City 
Auckland Regional Authority 
Christchurch Drainage Board 
Dunedin Drainage and Sewerage Board 
Hutt Valley Drainage Board 
North Shore Drainage Board 
b) Information requested 
x 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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1 Method of riharging for water supplies (metering), annual 
charge, general rate etc). 
2 Actual water supply charges (cost per gallon, rate in 
dollar etc). . 
3 Daily consumption per head for industrial, commercial 
and domestic uses categories. 
4 Special features of water supply charges e.g. reduc 
rates for large consumers or schools. 
5 Method of charging for sewerage services (annual 
charge, separate rate etc). 
6 Actual charge for sewerage services (amount of 
annual charge etc). 
7 Trade waste charges - amounts levied, and basis 
for formulating charges. 
BOARO FEE PLUS 0 OSIT 
Auckland RlJB See Table 5 
Range $75-$200 
Bay of Plenty CC and RlJB $15 
Hauraki CB and RlJB $20 
Manawatu CB and RlJB $30 
Marlborough CB and RlJB $20 
N son CB and RlJB $20 
No h Canterbury CB and RlJB $30 
Northland CC and RlJB $20 
Otago CB and RlJB $20 
Poverty Bay CB and RlJB $20 
Rangit -lJanganui CB and RlJB $38* 
ALLOCATION OF ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION 
COSTS 
Costs of major investigation may be 
charged to applicant 
In exceptional cases, claimed from 
applicant 
Not usually charged to applicant 
Under investigation 
Not usually charged to applicant 
Costs of major investig ion may be 
charged to applicant 
Applicant may be required to contribute 
to special tribunal cos 
Situation under review 
Not usually charged 
Not usually charged 
Costs in excess of $38 are charged 
to applicant 
("") 
:::r:: 
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::0 
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South Canterbury CBand RWB $2 
Southland CB $50 
Taranaki CC and RWB See Table 5 
($30-$200) 
Waik a Valley Authority $25 
Wairarapa CB and RWB $20 
. -Wai taki CC $30 
Wellington RWB $30 
Westland CB and RWB $20 
* mO\l cover mare than one right 
\ '" 
Not usually charged 
Applicant may be charged for cos 
if tribunal is held 
Under rev iew 
Nat usually charged 
Not usually charged 
Costs of complex investigation may 
be charged to applicant 
Casts of complex investigations 
charged to applicant 
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APPENDIX III WATER SUPPLY CHARGES - SURVEY RESULTS 
AREA METERING 1 BASIS FOR CHARGE' ACTUAL CHARGE CONSUMPTION' 
(g/head/day) 
Auckland Urban 
Area 
AUCKLAND CITY C,I, 10% D Separate rate plus 55.78¢/1000g 37 
excess charge for 
metered co~umption (A) 
BIRKENHEAD All Metered consumption 82¢/1000g Domestic 28.5 
BOROUGH (6m) Other 11 
DEVONPORT All Metered consumption $1/1000g 
BOROUGH (6m) 
EAST COAST All Metered consumption $1/1000g residents Average = 185 
BAYS CITY $1. 50/1 OOOg non residents 
Minimum $10.00/annum 
ELLERSLIE All Metered consumption 85¢/1000g 
BOROUGH 
GLEN EDEN All Metered consumption 90¢/1000g About 40,000g 
BOROUGH (6m) /household/annum 
HENDERSON All Metered consumption 75¢/1000g 
BOROUGH (6m except for large Minimum $6.00/annum 
consumers - m) 
COMMENT 
Reduced rate if con-
sumption exceeds 40 
million 9 / quarter 
$1.00/annum meter rent 
Special rate schools 
75¢/1000g 
New connections 
$60 (t") and $70 (3/4") 
I 
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AREA METERING1 BASIS FOR CHARGE2 ACTUAL CHARGE 
HOLlICK All Metered consumption (A) $1/1ooog 
BOROUGH 
MANUKAU CITY All Metered consumption 73¢/1ooog 
MT ALBERT All Metered consumption 85¢/1ooog 
BOROUGH 
MT EDEN BOROUGH All Metered consumption 82¢/1oo0g 
MT ROSKILL All Metered consumption Minimum $1o/year 
BOROUGH o (A) Others (Q) 90¢/1ooog 
Non consumers $1/year 
NELl LYNN BOROUGH All Metered consumption 85¢/1000g 
(6m) Minimum $3/6m 
NORTHCOTE All Metered consumption 80¢/1000g 
~WROUGH (6m) 
ONE TREE HILL All Metered consum)tion 
O&C (6m), I (m 
68¢/1 OOOg 
CONSUMPTION' 
(g/head/day) 
o = 18,000g/ 
head/annum 
30 
15,930/annum 
COMMENT : 
I 
I ~iscount of 10% to schools ~ 
, 
, 
, 
I 
I 
( 
I 
· 
· 
· 
Reducing rate over 2 
million 9 / annum 
School rate 48¢/1000g 
Non-co~sumers: .1¢/$ 
rateable value. 
Reducing rate for 
industrial consumers. 
.... 
..... 
.... 
AREA METERING BASIS FOR CHARGE 
ONEHUNGA All Metered consumption 
BOROUGH (6m) 
OTAHUHU All Metered consumption 
BOROUGH (6m) 
PAPAKURA CITY All Metered consumption 
(6m) 
PAPATOETOE CITY All Metered consumption 
(6m) 
TAKAPUNA CITY All Uniform annual charge 
metered consumption 
WAITEMATA CITY Some 
') Annual charge 
metered consumption 
Wellington Urban 
Area 
EASTBOURNE Some Annual charge or 
BOROUGH COUNCIL metered consumption 
ACTUAL CHARGE CO N SUMPTI ON 
(g/head/day) 
Range SO-59¢/1000g 
91 ¢/1 OOOg 
70¢/1000g 
91 ¢/1 OOOg . 
Annual charge = $16 
$1.00/1000g 
11,000g/annum 
Annual charge:: $25.50 
Non-consumer :: $12.75 
Annual charge: $34 93 
per dwelling/business 
25¢/1000g 
COMMENT 
Special rates for schools 
Range 52c - $1.02 for 
extraordinary charges 
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AREA METERING BASIS FOR CHARGE ACTUAL CHARGE 
LOWER HUTT CITY C,I 0- separate rate GI - half domestic 
C,I - metered consump- rate 
tion 64¢/1000g 
PORIRUA CITY C,I, schools Annual charge = $15 o - annual sharge 
Others - metered C, I : 57¢/1 OOOg 
consumption 
UPPER HUTT CITY C,I, schools o - general rate 40¢/1000g 
Others - metered 
consumption 
WELLINGTON CITY large consumers Separate rate .1975¢/$ rate 
metered consumption Minimum $10 
metered rate 
Range 32.7 - 72.7c 
Christchurch urban 
~ 
CHRISTCHURCH CITY All Separate rate and/or 25¢/1000g 
metered consumption 
RICCARTON C,I Separate rate 
BOROUGH metered consumption 
CONSUMPTI ON COMMENT 
(g/head/day) 
42 (D) Average domestic rate = $35 
Reduced rate - schools and 
hospitals - 47¢/1000g 
94 20% total usage non-domestic 
Free allowance - 1000m3 
98 Non-co~sumers - half water 
rate 
147 (maximum) Water rate levied on capital 
value; allowance of 1000g 
per 20c of rate charged. 
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AREA METERING BASIS FOR CHARGE 
Provincial centres 
GISBORNE CITY CfI D • general rate 
Others - metered 
consumption 
HAMIL TON CITY Some large Separate rate 
consumers 
INVERCARGILL I, some C Separate rate 
CITY metered consumption 
MT MAUNGANUI All Annual charge 
BOROUGH metered consumption 
NAPIER CITY· Large Separate rate 
consumers metered consumption 
NELSON CITY Large Separate rate 
consumers metered consumption 
PALMERS TON Large users Separate rate 
NORTH CITY metered consumption 
ACTUAL CHARGE CONSUMPTION 
(g/head/day) 
41¢/1000g 
2.088% rateable value 
Minimum = $10 
45.5¢/1000g 
.1381¢/$ rateable value 72 
47¢/1000g 
(outside city - 93¢/1000g) 
Annual charge = $16 12,000g/annum 
(covers 20,000g) 
Additional 60¢71000g) 
.209¢/$ rateable value 
minimum $6 
5 - 13c / 1000 1 
.144¢/$ rateable value 130 
minimum = $10 
25¢/1000g 
27¢/1000g (ordinary) 0 = 46 
22.5¢/1000{ (schools) Total = 81 
35¢/1000g non-rate payer 
COMMENT 
Non-consumers and commercial 
premises pay t rate. 
Residential average = $30 
Non-consumers - half rate 
Special agreement - see text 
Non consumers - half rate; 
metered charges applied on 
water consumed above value 
of rate 
15% metered 
Non consumers - half rate 
maximum daily use (summer): 
1.33 times average daily 
consumption 
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AREA METERING BASIS FOR CHARGE 
ROTORUA COUNTY Some Separate rate 
COUNCIL Annual charge 
Metered consumption 
TAUPO BOROUGH C, I , some D Annual charge 
metered consumption 
TAURANGA CITY C,I (some) Annual charge 
metered consumption 
TIMARU CITY C,I D = special rate 
Other = metered 
consumption 
and half rate 
,.1. 
tJANGANUI C lTY C,I D = general rate 
metered consumption 
ACTUAL CHARGE CONSUMPTION COMMENT 
(g/head/day) 
Vary - some in general 60-80 Charges vary. 
rate Special rate - sewerage 
Annual charge = $20 construction and water 
40-75¢/1000g supp ly 
Annual charge $30 
45¢/1000g 
72 (average) Non-consumers $4.5Q/annum 
130 (maximum) 
.34¢/$ 85 (average) Rate reduces to 41¢/1000g 
45.5¢/1000{ over - 1 million g 
57¢/1000g outside 
City) 
30¢/1000g Schools: 25¢/1000g 
7Ort/1000g (outside Reduced rate above 
city) 20 million 9 
1 C = commercial 2Meter readings 
I = industrial A = annual 
o = domestic 6m = 6 monthly 
Q = quarterly M = monthly 
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APPENDIX IV CHARGES FOR DRAINAGE AND SE~ERAGE SERVICES - SURVEY RESULTS 
AREA 
Major urban areas 
AUCKLAND CITY 
BIRKENHEAD BOROUGH 
CHRISTCHURCH CITY 
DEVON PORT BOROUGH 
EAST COAST BAYS CITY 
EASTBOURNE BOROUGH 
ELLERSLIE BOROUGH 
GLEN EDEN BOROUGH 
H[NDERSON BOROUGH 
HO~ICK BOROUGH 
LO~ER HUTT CITY 
BASIS FOR CHARGING 
Separate rate and set 
fee; installation fee 
General rate 
Separate rate 
Annual charge 
Separate rate 
Annual charge 
General rate 
General ri3te 
General rate 
General rate 
General rate 
CHARGE MADE 
Fee fluctuates annually 
charge on behalf of 
(1977) $24 per unit 
$23 per dwelling or 
business unit 
Annual charge for 
residential users outside 
city = $35 
TRADE ~ASTE CHARGES 
ARA (Auckland Regional 
Authority) 
North Shore Drainage Board 
Christchurch Drainage Board 
North Shore Drainage Board 
North Shore· Drainage Board 
ARA 
.ARA 
ARA 
ARA 
Hutt Valley Drainage Board 
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APPENDIX IV (contd ••• ) 
AREA BASIS FOR CHARGING 
MANUKAU CITY Separate rate 
EDEN BOROUGH GeneI' rate 
MT ROSKILL BOROUGH General rate 
NEW LYNN BOROUGH GeneI' rate 
NORTHCOTE BOROUGH Annual arge 
E TREE HILL General rate 
EHUNGA BOROUGH General rate 
OTAHUHU BOROUGH General rate 
PAPAKURA CITY General rate 
PAPATOETOE CITY General rate 
PORIRUA CITY Annual ch e 
RICCARTON BOROUGH Separate Rate 
CHARGE MADE 
Schools charged $2 per 
sewer connection 
DisconnBction fee ~ $60 
$22 per a) dwelling 
house or flat, or 
b) wc/urinal in any 
other building 
$9.50 per wc unit 
Christchurch Drainage 
Board rate 
TRADE WASTE CHARGES 
ARA 
ARA 
AR A 
A 
North Shore 
ARA 
ARA 
A 
A 
AR A 
at charged 
Christchurch Drainage Board 
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A DIX (contd ••• ) 
A A BASIS FOR CHARGING 
TAKAPUNA CITY Separate rate 
UPPER HUTT CITY General rate 
WELLINGTON CITY Separate rate 
Provincial areas 
~ 
GISBORNE CITY General rate 
HAMILTON CITY 
INVER CARGILL CITY Separate rate 
NAPIER CITY Gener rate 
NELSON CITY Gene rate 
ROTORUA CO 
TAUPO Separ e rate 
TA GA CITY Annual charge 
CHARGE MADE 
.218 rateable value 
minimum $2 
Speci ital 
contributions from 
subdividers 
subdividers charged 
at cost 
.120¢/$ 
Non rateable properties 
- special charge 
Connection fee $10 
$40 per wc unit 
$10 non consumers 
TRADE A ES 
H ey Draina 
Not charged 
Made on four wet 
industries (see table 8 ) 
None 
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APPENDIXIV CONT ••• 
AREA 
TIMARU CITY 
tJANGANUI CITY 
BASIS FOR CHARGING 
General rate 
General rate 
CHARGE MADE TRADE tJASn:: CHARGES 
Connection fee plied 
Fee for users By-lay in prepar on 
outside city - $100 pa 
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